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ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE

AIR LAND SEA

APPLICATION

CENTER

TECHINT

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND
PROCEDURES FOR

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
OPERA TIONS

FM 2-22.401

NTTP 2-01.4

AFTTP(I) 3-2.63

JUNE 2006

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:

Approved for public release; distribution is
unlimited.

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

FOREWORD

This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands
and other commands as appropriate.

•r

DAVID A. FASTABEND

Major General, US Army
Deputy Director/Chief of Staff

Army Capabilities Integration

Center

R.T. NOLAN

Rear Admiral, USN
Commander

Navy Warfare Development
Command

JACKSON

Brigadier General, USAF
Commander
Headquarters Air Force
Doctrine Center

This publication is available through the ALSA Web site

( www.alsa.mil) ; through the Army at Army Knowledge Online

(AKO) ( www.us.army.mil ) and at the General Dennis J.

Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library

( www.train.army.mil ) Web sites; and through the Air Force at

the Air Force Publishing Web site ( www.e-publishing.af.mil) .

PREFACE

1. Purpose

This publication provides a common set of multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures
(MTTP) for technical intelligence (TECHINT) operations. It serves as a reference for Service
TECHINT planners and operators to build and execute coordinated multi-Service TECHINT
operations. It provides guidance to tactical forces on the evacuation of captured materiel that
has intelligence value. Additionally, it informs the joint force commanders (JFCs) and their
staffs about the missions, requirements, and capabilities of TECHINT forces and essential
information to effectively employ and utilize TECHINT capabilities.

2. Scope

This publication guides planners through the process of requesting, deploying, and
employing the unique, highly specialized, and mission enhancing expertise of multi-Service
TECHINT teams. It is designed for planners at all levels and defines methods to ensure
TECHINT capabilities are fully integrated and utilized to the maximum extent possible to provide
captured enemy equipment identification, assessment, collection, exploitation, and evacuation
in support of national technical intelligence requirements. This publication:

Supplements established doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP).

Provides reference material to assist ground forces on the evacuation of captured

material of intelligence value.

Assists in planning and conducting TECHINT operations.

Promotes an understanding of the complexities of TECHINT operations.

Incorporates TTP, lessons learned, and the latest information available on TECHINT

operations.

3. Applicability

This multi-Service publication provides tactical guidance for commanders and staffs of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force.

4. Implementation Plan

Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) will review this
publication, validate the information and, where appropriate, reference and incorporate it in
Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:

Army. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the procedures
contained herein into the United States (US) Army Doctrine and Training Literature Program as
directed by the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
Distribution is in accordance with applicable directives and the Initial Distribution Number (IDN)
listed on the authentication page.

Navy. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in US Navy training and doctrine
publications as directed by the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command
(NWDC)[N5]. Distribution is in accordance with Military Standard Requisition and Issue
Procedure Desk Guide (MILSTRIP Desk Guide) Navy Supplement Publication-409 (NAVSUP
P-409).

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

Air Force. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication in accordance
with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance with Air Force Instruction
(AFI) 33-360.

5. User Information

a. TRADOC, NWDC, Headquarters AFDC, and the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA)
Center developed this publication with the joint participation of the approving Service
commands. ALSA will review and update this publication as necessary.

b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control
organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in Service
protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will likewise be incorporated in
revisions to this document.

c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your
comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each
recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to —

Army

Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

ATTN: ATFC-RD

Fort Monroe VA 23651-5000

DSN 680-3951 COMM (757) 788-3951

E-mail: doctrine(S>monroe. armv.mil

Navy

Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command

ATTN: N5

686 Cushing Road

Newport Rl 02841-1207

DSN 948-1070/4201 COMM (401) 841-1070/4201

E-mail: alsapubs(S>nwdc. navv.mil

Air Force

Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center

ATTN: DJ

155 North Twining Street

Maxwell AFBAL 361 12-61 12

DSN 493-2640/2256 COMM (334) 953-2640/2256

E-mail: afdc.di(5)maxwell. af.mil

ALSA

Director, ALSA Center

114 Andrews Street

Langley AFB VA 23665-2785

DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902

E-mail: alsa.director(S)lanqlev.af.mil

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401

NTTP 2-01.4

AFTTP(I) 3-2.63

FM 2-22.401

NTTP 2-01.4

AFTTP(I) 3-2.63

US Army Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia

Navy Warfare Development Command

Newport, Rhode Island

Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

9 June 2006

TECHINT

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
FOR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vii

CHAPTER I TECHINT OVERVIEW 1-1

Introduction 1-1

TECHINT Support to the Warfighter 1-1

Scientific and Technical Intelligence Community 1-2

Mission of Battlefield TECHINT 1-3

CHAPTER II ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 11-1

Introduction 11-1

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 11-1

Service Intelligence Centers 1 1-1

203d Military Intelligence Battalion 11-1

Combatant Commanders 11-2

Other Agencies 11-2

CHAPTER III TECHINT UNITS AND CAPABILITIES Ill-l

Department of Defense (DOD)/Joint Organizations Ill-l

Air Force Ill-l

Army 111-2

Navy 111-4

Other Agencies 1 1 1-4

DISTRUBUTION RESTRICTON: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

APPENDICES

REFERENCES

GLOSSARY

INDEX

FIGURES

TECHINT TEAM OPERATIONS IV-1

Introduction IV-1

Task Organization, Tasking, and Employment of TECHINT IV-1

TECHINT Operations Cycle IV-2

TECHINT Support to Sensitive Site Exploitation IV-4

CAPTURED MATERIEL EXPLOITATION CENTER (CMEC) V-1

Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC) V-1

Role and Mission of DIA LNOs (Technical Advisors) V-1

Role and Mission of the Captured Materiel Exploitation Center

(CMEC) V-2

Responsibilities V-3

Resource Requirements V-5

CMEC Concept of Operations V-5

Forms Prescribed/Adopted V-6

A. Sample TECHINT Appendix to an Intelligence Annex A-1

B. Technical Intelligence Reports B-1

C. Checklists C-1

D. Foreign Language Text Recognition D-1

E. Marking and Tagging E-1

F. Movement and Storage of Captured Materiel F-1

References-1

Glossary-1

lndex-1

Figure 1-1. DOD S&TI Community I-2

Figure IV-1. JTF Information Flow IV-1

Figure V-1. TECHINT Data Flow V-6

Figure C-1. Eight Basic Directions C-2

Figure D-1 . Partial List of Spoken Languages and Locations

Where They Are Spoken D-2

Figure D-2. Distinguishing Major Slavic Languages From

Russian D-7

Figure D-3. Cyrillic Alphabet and Transliteration Chart D-8

Figure D-4. International, Arabic, and Persian Numbers D-10

Figure D-5. The Arabic Alphabet D-11

Figure D-6. The Diacritics of Arabic and Persian D-12

Figure D-7. Printed Arabic D-12

Figure D-8. Typewritten Arabic D-13

Figure D-9. Printed Persian (Arrows indicate distinguishing

features.) D-13

FM 2-22.401 /NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

TABLES

Figure D-10. Sample of Chinese Text D-14

Figure D-11. Sample of Japanese Text D-15

Figure D-12. Shows Korean with Fewer Chinese Symbols

Used D-15

Figure D-13. The Fifty Most Common Chinese Character

Radicals D-16

Figure D-14. The Japanese Hiragana Syllabary D-17

Figure D-15. The Japanese Katakana Syllabary D-17

Figure D-16. The Korean Alphabet D-18

Figure E-1 . Example of the Front and Reverse Sides of an

EPW Capture Tag (DD Form 2745) E-2

Figure F-1 . Movement of Captured Materiel from Collection

Point to Storage F-2

Figure F-2. Storage Decision Making Matrix F-2

Figure F-3. Shipment to CONUS Decision Matrix F-3

Table B-1. Priority Listings B-6

Table C-1. Photolog Example C-3

Table C-2. TECHINT Operations Checklist for Maneuver S-2 C-4

9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TECHINT

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Technical Intelligence Operations

When established by a Joint Task Force Commander, the Captured Materiel Exploitation
Center (CMEC) conducts TECHINT operations against enemy air, sea, and ground forces in
combat and contingency operations and participates in related peacetime training activities such
as exercises and war games where technical intelligence applies.

TECHINT includes the identification, assessment, collection, exploitation, and evacuation of
captured enemy materiel (CEM) in support of national and immediate technical intelligence
requirements. The technical intelligence acquired through CMEC operations provides rapid
performance and vulnerability assessments of enemy equipment, giving a critical edge to US
forces in current and future operations.

The process for conducting TECHINT operations in a multi-Service environment begins at
the Service level. The Army and Air Force have dedicated TECHINT units to support CMEC
operations. In addition, each Service possesses TECHINT personnel to provide support,
augmentation, and subject matter expertise to CMEC operations. These units and personnel
receive specialized training to effectively operate in hostile and austere environments.

The unified commands play a major role in TECHINT tasking. Each unified command
should have a designated TECHINT planner within the intelligence directorate (J-2) to
coordinate requirements with national intelligence production centers and the joint staff.
TECHINT is an intelligence mission assigned to the J-2, who is responsible for CMEC activities.
The CMEC executes mission assignments based on immediate wartime support requirements
in addition to national collection requirements priorities. The J-2 coordinates support for CMEC
missions with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and then coordinates with each Service
through command channels to provide forces, capabilities, and support as required. The CMEC
commander reports directly to the J-2 to integrate new technical intelligence into current joint
force intelligence reports.

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 vii

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this publication:

Joint

US Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA

Defense Intelligence Agency (Pentagon), Alexandria, VA

Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Huntsville, AL

Army

US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA

National Ground Intelligence Center, Charlottesville, VA

203d Military Intelligence Battalion, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD

Navy

Navy Warfare Development Command (Norfolk Detachment), Norfolk, VA
Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, DC

Air Force

Air Force Doctrine Center, ATTN: DJ, Maxwell AFB, AL

Air Intelligence Agency, Lackland AFB, TX

National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

viii FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

Chapter I
TEC HI NT OVERVIEW

1. Introduction

a. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines technical intelligence as "Intelligence derived from
exploitation of foreign material, produced for strategic, operational, and tactical level
commanders. Technical intelligence begins when an individual Service member finds
something new on the battlefield and takes the proper steps to report it. The item is then
exploited at succeedingly higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize the
adversary's technological advantage."

b. The TECHINT mission is to:

(1) Prevent technological surprise and maintain US technological advantage against any
adversary.

(2) Provide the combatant commander with intelligence to effectively enhance
awareness of the enemy and force protection measures.

(3) Develop and employ effective countermeasures to defeat enemy weapon systems
andTTP.

(4) Provide tailored, timely, and accurate TECHINT support to the warfighter throughout
the entire range of military operations.

(5) Execute technical reconnaissance and assessment of enemy equipment and
capability; confirm or deny enemy order of battle.

c. TECHINT, as an intelligence product, is dependent on the timely employment of
TECHINT teams, and the subsequent collection, exploitation, and analysis of foreign warfighting
equipment and associated materiel. At the strategic level, the exploitation and interpretation of
foreign weapon systems, materiel, and technologies are referred to as scientific and technical
intelligence (S&TI). S&TI covers:

(1) Foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering
techniques.

(2) Scientific and technical (S&T) characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign
military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel.

(3) Research and development (R&D) related to these systems and the production
methods employed for their manufacture.

d. Employment of the Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC) during war and
contingencies supports these TECHINT goals and missions by the:

(1) Exploitation of captured or defecting enemy materiel and supporting documentation.

(2) Exploitation of known enemy foreign materiel and targets of opportunity by all
appropriate and available means.

2. TECHINT Support to the Warfighter

a. Operational and Tactical Level. Operational and tactical commanders rely on
technological advantage to successfully synchronize and execute complex modern operations.
The introduction of a surprise technological capability by an adversary causes confusion and

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 1-1

delays mission accomplishment until the capability is understood and countered. TECHINT is
the key to the early identification of an adversary's technical capabilities, vulnerabilities, and
intent. Technical intelligence provides the information for the development and employment of
countermeasures by the operational and tactical commander. TECHINT is a valuable force
enabler to the commander.

b. Strategic Level. The US has relied on its military strength and industrial infrastructure as
a strategic deterrent to war. The strength of the US military lies, in part, in the diversity and
extent of its technology base. While the US aspires to be the leader in integrating technology,
the actual products are available to any buyer. An adversary can achieve temporary
technological parity or advantage by acquiring modern systems or capabilities. The world arms
market is willing to provide these advanced systems to countries or individuals with the
resources to pay for them. A concerted TECHINT program is vital to providing precise direction
and purpose within the US R&D process to ensure that this parity or advantage is neutralized
quickly and efficiently.

c. Examples of Countermeasures. Countermeasures may range from the highly technical,
such as reprogramming a frequency in a radar jammer or radar warning receiver, to the
analytical changes based on the tactical situation. For example, a TECHINT team or CMEC
may determine that the main gun on the primary threat system has a range that is double what
was anticipated. Such a determination would force intelligence officers to rethink the disposition
of enemy forces and the placement of enemy obstacles and to adjust their analytical products
accordingly. This in turn could lead operational planners to rethink objectives, task
organizations, and many important operational control measures. In the end, enhanced
understanding of enemy capabilities would enable friendly forces to plan and prepare for the
warfight in such a way that the enhanced enemy capability would be negated.

3. Scientific and Technical Intelligence Community

a. The S&TI community satisfies the nation's strategic TECHINT objectives during
peacetime and supports operational TECHINT requirements in wartime. The S&TI community
starts at the DOD level. Figure 1-1 shows this organizational structure.

DOD

DIA

Army

MSIC

LEGEND

Command and Control

Coordination and Guidance ■

Air Force

NGIC

Navy

NAS1C

203rd MI BN

NAVEODTECHCEN

ONI

MC1A

Figure 1-1. DOD S&TI Community

b. S&TI organizations track and analyze foreign technological developments. They
analyze the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel that may have military

I-2

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.639

9 June 2006

application. Although the primary function of the S&TI community is to satisfy strategic
TECHINT objectives, it also makes significant contributions toward fulfilling operational and
tactical TECHINT requirements. Strategic communications between battlefield TECHINT units
and S&TI centers allow the use of their comprehensive databases and expertise to rapidly
satisfy the TECHINT requirements of the warfighter.

4. Mission of Battlefield TECHINT

a. Battlefield TECHINT provides rapid reporting on newly identified foreign weapon system
capabilities to combatant commands, joint task forces, and national intelligence centers.
Battlefield TECHINT supports operational and planning requirements during wartime operations,
worldwide crisis, and contingencies.

b. Battlefield TECHINT analyzes previously inaccessible and unknown systems to collect
rapid intelligence for use by warfighters and collects physical assets for long-term exploitation at
national intelligence centers. Classic examples include: The capture of the Wuerzburg Radar
during WW II and the identification and exploitation of the Seersucker surface-to-surface (SS)
missiles in Desert Storm, the SA-7B in Afghanistan, and the improvised explosive devices in
Iraq and Afghanistan. During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1991, TECHINT elements
reported a previously misidentified man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) that had much
greater capabilities than first thought, resulting in important changes to rotary wing air mission
planning and flight rules. These are good examples of how TECHINT enhances force
protection during combat and stability and support operation.

c. Battlefield TECHINT forces perform a unique and highly specialized mission. Their
capabilities range from system identification and assessment to sophisticated field exploitation.
Their efforts and products contribute to the development of new tactics and countermeasures
and their intelligence is used in the development of future US weapon systems.

d. TECHINT provides rapid reporting on captured enemy materiel (CEM) to commanders.
This intelligence supports force protection and the development of new tactics and
countermeasures and supports operational decisions based on foreign threats. On occasion,
commanders who were unfamiliar with TECHINT capabilities hesitated to employ TECHINT
assets and denied them access to vital CEM and facilities. Needless destruction of CEM denied
vital intelligence to the warfighter and to national intelligence and security organizations. CEM
was also pilfered in the past for the purpose of collecting war trophies. When the TECHINT
mission is understood and supported, its assets generate valuable intelligence information for
current and future operations. Types of TECHINT missions may include:

Technical reconnaissance.

Survey and assessment.

Technical identification.

Inventory.

Sensitive site exploitation (SSE).

Safety assessment.

Recovery, packaging, and shipping.

Field exploitation.

Battle damage assessment (BDA).

Prize crew operations (captured vessel operators).

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Chapter II
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Introduction

This chapter outlines the various responsibilities of each staff element in units on the
battlefield when supporting the overall battlefield TECHINT effort. Battlefield TECHINT
elements are resourced and responsible for collecting and processing CEM. Yet to work
properly, the battlefield TECHINT structure relies on many other units for mission support, such
as combat units which capture items and the transportation units which evacuate items of
TECHINT interest.

2. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

DIA, as the primary Joint agency with TECHINT responsibilities, coordinates requirements
with theater J-2s and assists during the entire operation plan (OPLAN) development process.
Usually, the Service component with the greatest TECHINT interest (e.g., land, or air) will assist
DIA during this process. DIA compiles the requirements from the Service intelligence centers
and develops the theater specific master requirements list. DIA provides liaison officers and
augmentation personnel for the CMEC as required.

3. Service Intelligence Centers

a. Each of the Service intelligence centers provides:

(1) Trained battlefield TECHINT organizations that can deploy on short notice to
contingency operations worldwide. Personnel should be equipped with all necessary personal
equipment, be qualified on weapons, and possess the technical equipment required for their
exploitation operations.

(2) Subject matter experts as required based on exploitation and information
requirements.

(3) A theater-specific prioritized list of requirements with sufficient supporting collection
information such as photographs, specifications, probable unit associations, etc.

b. Service intelligence centers include:

• Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC)

• National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC)

• National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)

• Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA)

• Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

• Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC)

• Naval Explosive Ordnance Technical Center (NAVEODTECHCEN)

4. 203d Military Intelligence Battalion (203d Ml Battalion)

The 203d Ml Battalion is the Army's only TECHINT battalion. The mission of the 203d is to
deploy worldwide to conduct TECHINT reconnaissance, establish the CMEC, where the CEM is
concentrated and exploited at the tactical and operational levels, and to prepare it for shipment

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 11-1

to intelligence production centers where it can be exploited at the strategic level. The 203d is
also responsible for disseminating the resulting intelligence to combatant commanders and any
other relevant parties.

a. The 203d Ml Battalion conducts TECHINT team collection operations.

b. It performs CMEC operations and serves as the base organization of any CMEC when
operating in a theater that is considered primarily a land component operation.

c. It trains tactical battlefield TECHINT tactics, techniques, and procedures.

d. It receives and integrates TECHINT intelligence community augmentation during both
team and CMEC operations.

5. Combatant Commanders

a. In coordination with DIA, combatant commanders determine what level of TECHINT
support is required for mission execution. The basic options for TECHINT support are the
employment of a small TECHINT liaison element, one or more TECHINT teams, or
establishment of a fully staffed CMEC.

b. Combatant commanders inform the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)
concerning the level of TECHINT support required.

c. The combatant commander's staff, ICW DIA and the lead Service component, develops
the TECHINT portion of the OPLAN, and then generates the request for forces (RFF) or request
for capability (RFC).

d. The combatant commander's staff plans for TECHINT-required facilities, transportation,
and communications, and other logistical support.

e. Combatant commanders employ TECHINT forces, as required. TECHINT forces should
be ready to react to early collection opportunities. TECHINT forces are most effective when
employed during decisive operations.

f. The J-2 will have the primary responsibility to integrate TECHINT forces in theater, will
coordinate collection opportunities, and serves as the combatant commander's principal advisor
on TECHINT operations in theater. The J-2 may have liaison officers from DIA that assist with
these tasks.

g. Combatant commanders provide force protection for TECHINT operations.

6. Other Agencies

Other agencies may contribute capabilities to the TECHINT mission. These may include the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire arms, and Explosives (ATF), Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), Threat Systems Management Office (TSMO), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and the
Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) (see chapter III).

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

Chapter III
TECHINT UNITS AND CAPABILITIES

1. Department of Defense (DOD) / Joint Organizations

a. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): DIA provides oversight for TECHINT activities
throughout DOD during peacetime and war. The S&TI directorate within DIA is the action
element for TECHINT. This directorate coordinates with external TECHINT agencies on non-
policy matters concerning the production of S&TI.

(1) Defense HUMINT Service (DHS): DHS conducts worldwide HUMINT operations in
support of foreign materiel acquisition and exploitation.

(2) Documents Exploitation (DOCEX): DOCEX translates and exploits foreign hard copy
and digital media for current relevant information.

b. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC): AFMIC is a DOD intelligence
production center under control of DIA. AFMIC is responsible for exploiting foreign medical
materiel. The director supports the Army Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program (FMEP) and
Army medical R&D requirements.

c. Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC): MSIC is a DOD intelligence production
center under control of DIA and supports the FMEP. The MSIC acquires, produces, maintains,
and disseminates S&TI pertaining to missile and space weapons systems, subsystems,
components, and activities, such as:

• Antitank guided missiles (ATGMs).

• Tactical air defense.

• Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).

• Directed energy weapons.

• Anti-satellite technology.

d. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA): The central R&D organization
for DOD. It manages and directs selected basic and applied R&D projects for DOD and
pursues research and technology where risk and payoff are both very high and where success
may provide dramatic advances for traditional military roles and missions. DARPA sponsors
R&D in all aspects of TECHINT, imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT),
human intelligence (HUMINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).

e. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA): DTRA is the DOD agency for counter-
proliferation and remediation.

f. Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Units: Provide technical intelligence
collection and reporting. They provide assessment, identification, disposal, and render safe
conventional; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN); and improvised explosive
devices. They also assist in movement, packaging, and hazardous material certification for
transportation.

2. Air Force

NASIC is the primary agency producing foreign aerospace S&TI. It satisfies DIA
requirements and supports the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (AFACSI) by
providing subject matter experts (SME) and TECHINT collection teams for deployable

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 111-1

capability. NASIC acquires, analyzes, produces, and disseminates information related to
current and future enemy aerospace capabilities including:

• Aircraft, air-launched weapons systems and munitions, electronic attack, communication
systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and radar systems.

• Ground-based systems including ground control intercept radars, target acquisition
radars associated with surface-to-air missile (SAM) complexes; air defense command,
control, and communications (C3) systems; and camouflage, concealment, and
deception (CC&D) equipment such as paints, nets, and target decoys.

3. Army

a. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ODCSINT): Although ODCSINT does
not produce intelligence; it does have general staff responsibility for all Army TECHINT
activities. The ODCSINT:

• Formulates policies and procedures for S&TI activities.

• Supervises and carries out the Army S&TI program.

Coordinates Department of the Army (DA) staff and major subordinate command
requirements for TECHINT.

• Is responsible for the Army Foreign Materiel Program (FMP).

b. 20th Support Command (chemical, biological radioactive, nuclear, or high yield
explosives [CBRNE]): The 20th Support Command integrates, coordinates, deploys, and
provides trained and ready forces and is prepared to exercise command and control of full-
spectrum CBRNE operations to joint and Army force commanders. The command maintains
technical links with appropriate joint, federal, and state CBRNE assets, as well as research,
development, and technical communities to assure Army CBRNE response readiness. The
organization also provides training and readiness oversight to the 1 1 1th Ordnance Group
(EOD). As requested, they provide technical expertise and assistance to the continental US
Armies in support of the training and readiness oversight of reserve component CBRNE forces.

(1) 52nd Ordnance Group/1 11th Ordnance Group (EOD): These units deploy trained
EOD forces and exercise command and control of EOD operations to support combatant
commanders and military installations. They provide military support/assistance to civil
authorities to detect, identify, render safe, and dispose of unexploded ordnance and improvised
explosive devices. Additionally, they react to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) explosive incidents which threaten forces, citizens, or operations in or outside the
continental United States. Upon request, they provide EOD support to the US Secret Service
and the US State Department. They transform the EOD program to meet future requirements.

(2) Technical Escort (TE) Battalion: A TE battalion is charged with identification,
assessment, render safe, movement, and remediation of foreign and domestic chemical and
biological munitions, devices, and hazardous materials.

c. US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM):

(1 ) Under the direction of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), INSCOM is a
major Army command and is responsible for peacetime TECHINT operations. Headquarters,
INSCOM, fulfills its responsibilities through its TECHINT oversight function and manages the
Army's Foreign Materiel for Training (FMT) Program and FMEP. It does this by:

I-2 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

(a) Providing the interface with strategic S&TI agencies in support of foreign
materiel exploitation.

(b) Organizing, training, and equipping echelons above corps (EAC) TECHINT
organizations during peacetime.

(2) Headquarters, INSCOM is the parent organization of NGIC and manages the Army's
Foreign Materiel Program (FMP). NGIC produces and maintains intelligence on foreign
scientific developments, ground force weapons systems, and associated technologies. NGIC
analysis includes, but is not limited to, military comm-electronics (C-E) systems including:

(a) Types of aircraft used by foreign ground forces (usually rotary wing).

(b) CBRN systems.

(3) INSCOM further provides the Active Component (AC) personnel and resource
contribution to the Military Intelligence Readiness Command's (MIRC) 203d Ml Battalion.

d. Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC):

(1) MIRC is the US Army Reserve Command's (USARC) functional command charged
with providing command and control of Army Reserve military intelligence units and Soldiers.

(2) MIRC is the parent organization of the 203d Ml Battalion. The 203d Ml BN is
headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and is the Army's only TECHINT battalion.
The 203d Ml BN:

• Conducts TECHINT reporting and collection in support of validated operational and
standing S&TI objectives.

• Acts as the HQDA executive agent for foreign materiel used for training purposes.

• Conducts formalized operational TECHINT training for DOD analysts and for both
AC and Reserve Component (RC) TECHINT personnel.

• Supports NGIC's foreign materiel acquisition (FMA) operations and foreign materiel
exploitation (FME) operations as directed.

• Forms core element of CMEC in support of ground combat operations. Provides
logistics and infrastructure to absorb joint and interagency TECHINT assets in order
to form CMEC.

• Provides the capability to field/deploy TECHINT collection teams and conducts
warehousing, in-country exploitation, packaging, and CEM transportation operations.
Also conducts collection management and dissemination (CM&D) of CEM.

• Provides military TECHINT analysts, who work with remotely located SMEs on
ground-based weapons systems, munitions, vehicles, and communications systems.

• Responds to emerging TECHINT missions associated with counterinsurgency
operations. Forms weapons intelligence teams (WIT) to conduct forensic analysis in
support of EOD operations. The WITs are task organized to operate with EOD
forces and provide a direct link between EOD companies and brigade combat teams.

e. US Army Materiel Command (AMC): AMC is a major Army command with a significant
support role in TECHINT. Among AMC elements are a series of research, development, and
engineering centers (ARDECs), the Army Research Laboratory System, and the US Army Test
and Evaluation Command (TECOM). Each element plays a role in wartime in conducting highly

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 III-3

technical evaluations of foreign equipment. In peacetime, the AMC conducts FME on
equipment purchased by each laboratory and by the research, development, and engineering
center (RDEC) for the intelligence community and for DOD as part of the International Materiel
Evaluation Program (IMEP). AMC's foreign ordnance exploitation team is at the Fire Support
Armaments Center (FSAC) EOD (Picatinny Arsenal). They exploit foreign ground ordnance and
develop render safe procedures (RSP) for foreign ordnance. They also prepare detailed
intelligence reports to support EOD, intelligence, and US munitions developer communities.

4. Navy

a. The Navy proponent for TECHINT in the ONI is designated ONI-23. ONI provides S&TI
on technical characteristics and capabilities of foreign naval forces and merchant systems and
manages the Navy's Foreign Materiel Program (FMP). It provides S&TI support to the
commander of the ONI and the Chief of Naval Operations. ONI:

• Provides SMEs in sea-based weapon systems, weapons, munitions, platforms,
merchant vessels, and communication systems.

• Provides capability to field/deploy TECHINT collection teams, in-country exploitation,
and packaging of CEM.

b. NAVEODTECHCEN is the training center for all joint EOD personnel. It acts as the
primary center for establishing identification, RSP, and demolition procedures for foreign
ordnance. It is augmented by Army EOD specialists from Picatinny Arsenal.

c. NAVEOD Scientific and Technical Intelligence Liaison Officer (STILO): The STILO
expedites initial reporting and coordinates CMEC efforts by embedding TECHINT personnel
with corps and equivalent units. The STILO is responsible for examining CEM in the field and
reports findings to the supported commander. The STILO also provides advice on handling,
control, and evacuation procedures of CEM. Through coordination with the STILO, Corps and
equivalent units transport or arrange for the movement of selected items to the CMEC. The
STILO is attached to each Corps or appropriate subordinate command as directed by the
theater commander.

5. Other Agencies

Other agencies with potential TECHINT involvement that may provide personnel,
equipment, and expertise to a CMEC include:

National Security Agency (NSA)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire Arms and Explosives (ATF)

Department of Energy (DOE)

Department of State (DOS)

Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC)

Chemical Materials Agency (CMA)

Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM)

Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (JCBRND)

Soldiers System Center (SSC)

1-4 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

Chapter IV
TECHINT TEAM OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

This chapter describes battlefield TECHINT operations, functions, and procedures.
Battlefield TECHINT operations consist of planning, collection, field exploitation, initial TECHINT
reporting, analysis, evacuation (as necessary), detailed exploitation and analysis, and
production and dissemination of final TECHINT products. The term "battlefield" includes any
area of operation that US forces occupy while conducting the full range of military operations.

a. Battlefield TECHINT can start with identifying something new, modified, or unexpected in
the order of battle within the area of operations and taking the proper steps to report it.

b. The information or item is initially exploited to ascertain if it represents an advantage for
the enemy or presents a technical surprise for friendly forces. If it does, the information or item
then undergoes increasing levels of analysis until a countermeasure or TTP is developed and
the technological advantage is neutralized. While a single weapon or technology seldom means
the difference between final victory and defeat, it can give one side a battlefield advantage.

c. Battlefield TECHINT is an intelligence mission assigned to the joint force commander's
(JFC) J-2. When a CMEC is established, it is aligned under the J-2. The JTF Commander
determines the joint CMEC (JCMEC) command relationships.

Reach back to
Foreign Materiel
Program Offices ky

JTF

J-2 Intel

J-3 Ops

DIA LNO (TECHINT Advisor)

_ i

/
s

JCMEC Staff

Materiel Exploitation, Storage
and Preparation Center

- Team
Collection

Team
Collection

JTF Headquarters

Captured Materiel
Exploitation Center (CMEC)

Teams attached to
maneuver units

Figure IV-1. JTF Information Flow

2. Task Organization, Tasking, and Employment of TECHINT

a. TECHINT assets are task organized based on theater/national intelligence requirements,
tactical and theater force structure, threat environment, and assigned mission and role.

9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

IV-1

b. TECHINT assets and other assets assigned to a TECHINT effort may consist of multi-
Service and intra-agency components such as military tactical intelligence battalions, in-country
exploitation teams (ICE), STILO from Naval Intelligence, Air Force foreign materiel exploitation
teams, EOD teams, technical escort (TE) units, DIA, CIA, ATF, FBI, DOE, DTRA, DHS,
Department of Health (DH), NSA, national laboratories, and others to include functional assets
such as document exploitation (DOCEX), chemical and biological intelligence support team
(CBIST), medical exploitation (MEDEX), HUMINT, hazardous material transportation office
(HMTO), Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC), and weapons intelligence teams (WIT).
Assets also include assigned or attached security and logistic support elements.

c. In many operations the involvement of coalition (non-US) partners has become the
standard. This has also been true in recent TECHINT operations. Multi-national (coalition)
operations require special planning for command and control (C2), intelligence sharing,
communications, and combat service support (CSS) requirements. The OPLAN or a
fragmentary order (FRAG order) can be used to establish these relationships.

3. TECHINT Operations Cycle

a. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB): Once the combatant commander has
determined the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and intelligence requirements (IRs), the
assigned TECHINT planner analyzes those requirements to determine where and how
TECHINT may provide information to help answer them. Given national requirements for S&TI,
the assigned TECHINT planner may recommend inclusion of several TECHINT intelligence
requirements to the existing PIRs and IRs. The assigned TECHINT planner and staff then
develop technical intelligence taskings and roles and develop the commander's TECHINT PIR,
IR, and specific information requests (SIR) for the CMEC and TECHINT collection teams. The
assigned TECHINT planner helps develop TECHINT commander's critical information
requirements (CCIR) and SIR of a TECHINT nature. The assigned TECHINT planner ensures
requirements are closely coordinated with combatant command J-2, or theater Army G-2, as
well as major subordinate elements: for example, Corps G-2. The assigned TECHINT planner
then integrates and deconflicts these CCIR and SIR with other items of special interest to the
S&TI community in conjunction with developing the prioritized TECHINT requirements collection
list. The requirements list should be accompanied by a collection support package to support
targeting and collection. The collection support package should include probable or expected
locations, photographs and imagery, hazard and handling instructions, and other known
specifications. The format of this list may vary, but is usually provided by DIA. TECHINT
collection teams attached to maneuver units may preplan missions to sites most likely to contain
items of TECHINT interest.

b. Requirements Dissemination to Maneuver Units and Other Agencies:

(1) National-level requirements and theater-level requirements are consolidated and
prioritized at the J-2 and disseminated through military intelligence and operations channels by
the all-source analysis element. The CMEC templates likely locations where items of TECHINT
interest will likely be found on the battlefield. This is referred to as "TECHINT templating."

(2) The TECHINT collection list is normally found in the TECHINT appendix to the
Intelligence Annex to the operations order (OPORD) at all echelons above maneuver brigade or
group. Appropriate units are notified, through intelligence channels that these items may be
within their areas of operations and are tasked for collection through operational channels. The
taskings must be translated into terms that combat, support, and specific collectors can
understand. TECHINT personnel communicate TECHINT requirements using an appropriate
presentation format.

IV-2 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

c. Equipment Capture, Notification, and Intelligence Value Assessment (Capture
Notification Reporting). When maneuver units capture materiel identified on the collection
requirements list or come across materiel that remains unidentified, appears modified, or is
otherwise out of the ordinary or unexpected, a size, activity, location, unit/uniform, time, and
equipment (SALUTE) report must be generated and sent back through reporting channels.
Units should strive to safeguard materiel or transport to safe holding areas if the security
environment permits, but only if materiel is safe for transport/storage as determined by EOD. If
materiel must be destroyed or left in place, all efforts to obtain photos of items, grid coordinates,
and factory markings/serial numbers should be taken. Documents associated with captured
equipment should be collected and sent through intelligence channels to the CMEC, where they
will be processed prior to shipment into DOCEX channels. Equipment should be tagged by the
capturing units as indicated in appendix E (Marking and Tagging).

(1) The TECHINT LNO at corps G-2 (or lowest level) monitors reporting for information
relating to materiel of technical intelligence value. A designated member of the J-2 serves as
the primary LNO between the CMEC, DIA, the Service centers, and the JTF. The LNOs screen
reports arriving from intelligence reporting channels.

(2) The TECHINT LNO compares reporting information with outstanding requirements to
see if collection is necessary. Depending on the priority of the requirement and tactical
situation, the TECHINT LNO will:

• Coordinate with the G-3 to transport and task the corps TECHINT collection team to
the capture site.

• Give further instructions for exploitation and/or evacuation procedures to the
capturing unit S-2.

(3) If an intelligence requirement no longer exists for the captured equipment, the
TECHINT LNO informs the capturing S-2 and coordinates the disposal of the materiel within
normal logistics channels.

(4) The corps TECHINT LNO forwards an information copy of the SALUTE report, with
details of initial actions taken, to the CMEC and TECHINT teams.

(5) The TECHINT teams reach back to the CMEC or the Service intelligence centers to
obtain SME assessment of the captured materiel and their recommended disposition (detailed
in-country exploitation, component recovery, retrograde, or destruction).

d. Mission Planning and Approval (FRAGOrder): Upon notification of equipment capture, a
TECHINT team and their supporting security support element must plan and gain approval for
the TECHINT mission to the site. A TECHINT team must be identified and notified for mission
execution. The team should be task organized for a specific mission, with the right type of
expertise and equipment. The mission commander should normally be the individual best able
to lead the TECHINT team to successfully obtain raw battlefield intelligence that satisfies the
commander's PIRs and CCIRs. This mission commander selection should be situation and
individual dependent. Other support requirements must be tasked and included for the mission
as required, such as logistics, support, and appropriate transportation assets. Route planning,
unit to unit coordination, communications, and checkpoints are the responsibility of the mission
commander. Overall mission plans should cover the items in the mission planning checklist in
appendix C (Checklists).

e. TECHINT Exploitation Mission Execution Phases:

(1) Tactical movement is led by, or is executed in coordination with, the security element
providing support to TECHINT.

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 IV-3

(2) Securing the site is also the responsibility of the security support element or the unit
in control of the site to be exploited.

(3) EOD should ensure area is safe to conduct exploitation operations and hazardous
materials/weapons/weapon systems are in a condition supportive of exploitation plan.

(4) Once a TECHINT unit takes custody of a TECHINT item, battlefield TECHINT
exploitation begins. TECHINT analysts and specialists use checklists and standard operating
procedures (SOPs) established by S&TI agencies and the CMEC to exploit each type of threat
equipment for which requirements exist. Disposition requirements for CEM must be assessed
during the technical exploitation process.

(5) Marking and tagging CEM should be accomplished by TECHINT teams in
accordance with appendix E (Marking and Tagging).

(6) Teams coordinate disposition of assets. For items assessed to require further
exploitation, TECHINT teams prepare CEM for transportation and coordinate the movement in
accordance with the procedures in appendix F (Movement and Storage of Captured Materiel).
Disposition may include destruction, limited exploitation, disablement, or complete/partial
transport. Tactical movement back to base is executed in coordination with the security element
providing support to TECHINT

f. TECHINT Reporting:

(1) The TECHINT team is responsible for producing the preliminary technical report
(PRETECHREP) (see appendix B) on all materiel exploited within 24 hours of discovery via
what ever appropriately classification communications that are available.

(2) A complementary technical intelligence report (COMTECHREP) (see appendix B)
may be required when CEM assessed the asset to have intelligence value or when directed by
J-2 or CMEC. Service intelligence centers may request COMTECHREP reporting.

(3) TECHINT reporting from CMEC or TECHINT teams to the theater Analysis and
Control Element (ACE) is conducted through existing communications channels.

(4) The CMEC sends its completed products to the J-2 and to the theater ACE. This
report is based on the standard intelligence information report (MR) format. TECHINT reports
are then disseminated through two channels. The ACE fuses the TECHINT single-source
product into its all-source reports and disseminates them through normal intelligence channels.
While the TECHINT single-source product is being integrated into the ACE all-source product,
the CMEC disseminates the single-source TECHINT product through TECHINT
communications channels to the national S&TI centers in the continental United States
(CONUS). This ensures both the rapid dissemination of TECHINT and the fusion of TECHINT
into all-source products. The CMEC ensures that reports to include exploitation results are
disseminated within theater.

4. TECHINT Support to Sensitive Site Exploitation

Task organized TECHINT teams are assigned to support the exploitation of sensitive sites
identified through pre-combat intelligence or daily reporting from maneuver forces. The site
may, or may not, have significant CEM value, however, the identified site should be of critical
value to the combatant commander and must be fully exploited for all intelligence value.
Sensitive sites may include research and design laboratories, factories, depots, seaports,
airfields, headquarters, and scientific facilities.

IV-4 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

Chapter V
CAPTURED MATERIEL EXPLOITATION CENTER (CMEC)

1. Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC)

a. When established by the JTF combatant commander, CMEC conducts TECHINT
operations against enemy air, sea, and ground forces in combat and contingency operations
and participates in related peacetime training activities such as exercises and war games where
technical intelligence applies.

b. The recovery of CEM is both a combatant command and national requirement.
Subsequent exploitation of CEM can provide critical intelligence on enemy strengths and
weaknesses that can favorably influence operational planning and force protection. The CMEC
normally conducts this exploitation mission. Combatant commands or subordinate joint forces
should notify the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) through command channels
that CMEC support is required. This will ensure that appropriate Service component resources
are allocated.

c. TECHINT is the process of identification, assessment, collection, exploitation, and
evacuation of CEM in support of national technical intelligence requirements. TECHINT
acquired through CMEC operations provides rapid performance and vulnerability assessments
of enemy equipment, giving a critical edge to US forces in current and future operations.

d. Each Service has dedicated TECHINT organizations capable of supporting CMEC
operations. These organizations receive specialized training to effectively operate in hostile and
austere environments.

e. The process for tasking and employing TECHINT operations in the joint environment
begins at the unified command level. Each unified command must have a designated TECHINT
planner within the intelligence directorate to coordinate requirements with national intelligence
production centers and the joint staff.

f. TECHINT is an intelligence mission assigned to the J-2, who is responsible for CMEC
activities. The CMEC executes mission assignments based on national collection requirement
priorities. The J-2 coordinates support for CMEC missions with DIA. The CMEC commander
reports directly to the J-2 to integrate new technical intelligence into current joint force
intelligence reports.

2. Role and Mission of DIA LNOs (Technical Advisors)

a. The DIA technical advisor is the primary J-2 staff element with TECHINT responsibility
and serves as the requirements control authority for the CMEC. The advisor deploys upon
notification by the theater commander when TECHINT operations will be conducted in a theater
of operations.

b. DIA technical advisors provide the proper coordination necessary for the maximum
effective collection, exploitation, extraction, and assessment of CEM. DIA advisors provide
TECHINT advice and assistance to the theater J-2. They also act as the TECHINT collection
LNO for the theater. They coordinate with national exploitation organizations and provide a
CEM priority list to J-2. They coordinate closely with DIA to ensure both national and theater
level foreign materiel collection requirements are satisfied.

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 V-1

3. Role and Mission of the Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC)

a. The CMEC acts as the central location for the collection, safeguarding, identification,
battlefield exploitation and reporting, and evacuation of CEM that has intelligence value.

b. The theater commander determines the location of the CMEC. This location facilitates
the storage, movement, and evacuation of CEM. The CMEC must consider force protection
requirements and have easy access to communications, transportation, and other support
facilities. The CMEC should be located in close proximity to the Joint Document Exploitation
Center (JDEC), the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC), and the Captured
Ammunition Holding Area (CAHA). The CMEC, JDEC, and JIDC facilities have common site
selection criteria and complimentary functions that provide efficient allocation of assets for
movement, safeguarding, exploitation, and evacuation of captured enemy personnel,
equipment, and materiel.

c. The CMEC functions as the theater's central CEM and materiel exploitation facility. As
such it:

(1) Establishes procedures for the exploitation and evacuation of CEM in coordination
with the J-4.

(2) Produces and disseminates tactical intelligence reports and preliminary technical
reports.

(3) Monitors the collection of priority CEM upon notification.

(4) Secures and maintains an inventory of all CEM.

(5) Assists in the processing and shipping of CEM from theater for further analysis and
exploitation.

(6) Operates with personnel assembled from Service TECHINT assets and capabilities.
The theater commander supports CMEC operations with augmenting security forces, explosive
ordnance disposal personnel, transportation elements, and other "base-level" activities as
needed. The CMEC commander and deputy are appointed by DIA and are responsible for the
overall operation and administration of the CMEC. Upon notification that a CMEC is required in
theater, normally it will consist of the following sections:

(a) Operations Center. The operations center is responsible for the planning and
coordination of all current and projected CMEC operations including the deployment of STILOs
and TECHINT collection teams. The operations center maintains the current CEM intelligence
situation.

(b) Support Center. The support center is responsible for providing administrative
and logistics support to all CMEC elements and personnel.

(c) Storage Center. The storage center maintains all records on CEM that is
processed through or by the CMEC. This includes any structure and/or facility that has been
inspected or reviewed by CMEC personnel.

(d) Communications Center. The communications center is responsible for
providing communications, automated information systems, and related maintenance support to
all CMEC elements.

(e) Exploitation Center. The exploitation center processes validated requirements,
exploits CEM, produces intelligence reports, and ensures dissemination of TECHINT data.

(f) Scientific and Technical Intelligence Liaison Officers (STILOs). The STILO
expedites initial reporting and coordinates CMEC efforts by embedding TECHINT personnel

V-2 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

with corps and equivalent units. The STILO is responsible for examining CEM in the field and
reports findings to the supported commander. The STILO also provides advice on handling,
control, and evacuation procedures of CEM. Through coordination with the STILO, corps and
equivalent units transport or arrange for the movement of selected items to the CMEC. The
STILO is attached to each corps or appropriate subordinate command as directed by the theater
commander.

4. Responsibilities

a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

(1) Identify and include, in all applicable implementing orders, TECHINT mission
objectives, priorities, and taskings.

(2) Plan for and coordinate the deployment of TECHINT forces with the combatant
commands and the Military Departments.

(3) Promulgate joint TECHINT doctrine.

(4) Establish a position on the Joint Staff to coordinate integration of TECHINT forces
into operations and identify requirements for the Joint Staff. The incumbent of this position shall
be the CJCS representative on the Joint TECHINT Planning Group (JTIPG).

b. Combatant Commanders

(1 ) Plan for, task, deploy, and employ TECHINT forces during wartime operations,
contingencies, joint exercises, and other events involving CEM of intelligence value. In all
applicable crisis and deliberate plans, include a TECHINT appendix that establishes a joint
TECHINT concept of operations and the initial collection requirements.

(2) Assist TECHINT forces in coordinating facilities, transportation, and communications
and provide other logistical support to sustain deployed personnel.

(3) Plan to employ TECHINT forces during the initial phase of an operation to ensure
TECHINT collection on critical CEM.

(4) Identify a TECHINT staff position within the J-2 to plan for the employment of
TECHINT forces. The TECHINT staff position will have the primary responsibility to integrate
TECHINT forces in theater and coordinate collection opportunities. The incumbent of this
position is the combatant command representative in the JTIPG.

(5) Ensure tasking and requests for forces, identify the operational controlling authority
for TECHINT forces, and provide an in-theater point of contact for initial coordination.

(6) Ensure TECHINT data is reviewed for protection of classified information and
transmitted in accordance with applicable security regulations and local instructions.

(7) Coordinate with the Joint Staff to publish specific guidelines for exploitation data
distribution, clearance, and security classification requirements.

(8) Include within Command, Control and Communication Systems Annex of the
operations plan the communication requirements necessary for the transmission of TECHINT
data to DIA and national intelligence centers.

c. Service Components
(1) Air Force

(a) Headquarters United States Air Force

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 V-3

Establish Air Force TECHINT doctrine.

Designate an 0-6 or civilian equivalent representative to the JTIPG.

Notify the Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) and appropriate major commands,
with HQ USAF/TE coordination, of any short-term, time-sensitive collection
requirements.

Monitor TECHINT activities.

Provide TECHINT collection and exploitation teams as tasked.

(b) Air Intelligence Agency

Provide overall policy and guidance for TECHINT functions and associated
capabilities.

Appoint a TECHINT functional manager as the AIA focal point for TECHINT
operations.

Program and budget for resources to sustain TECHINT functions.

Coordinate with DIA on CMEC participation.

Provide TECHINT collection and exploitation teams as tasked.

Provide prioritized exploitation requirements for Air Force TECHINT
operations.

Establish a training program to ensure Air Force TECHINT teams can
accomplish TECHINT requirements.

Assume primary responsibility for Air Force TECHINT functions.

Provide TECHINT collection and exploitation teams as tasked.

Provide CMEC support staff as required.

Provide STILOs as required.

(2) Army

(a) Provide TECHINT organizations (LNO to battalion) for team operations and
CMEC establishment.

(b) Provide supporting TECHINT staff for OPLAN development.

(d) Provide rotational sustainment for prolonged operations.

(e) Mobilize and deploy RC TECHINT units for early utilization during decisive
maneuver phase if applicable.

(f) Receive and integrate joint augmentation (military and civilian) into the CMEC

structure.

(g) Provide security, EOD, communications, and dedicated transportation assets
as required for CMEC operations.

V-4

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

(3) Navy

(a) Chief of Naval Operations. Provide overall policy and guidance for TECHINT
functions and associated capabilities (OPNAVINST 3882.2A).

(b) Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI). Appoint a functional manager as the Navy
focal point for TECHINT operations.

• Coordinate with DIA on CMEC operations.

• Designate a representative to the JTIPG.

• Provide prioritized exploitation requirements for Navy TECHINT operations.

• Establish a training program to ensure Navy/Navy Reserve TECHINT
teams can accomplish TECHINT requirements.

• Assume primary responsibility for Navy TECHINT functions.

• Provide TECHINT ICE teams as tasked.

5. Resource Requirements

a. DIA is responsible for special requirements for CMEC operations (in regards to
transportation assets, communications assets, and the full range of logistics support).

b. Services are responsible for training personnel and providing individual equipment for
mission responsibilities. Services are also responsible for providing specialized TECHINT
equipment necessary to meet mission requirements.

6. CMEC Concept of Operations

The CMEC and TECHINT teams produce technical intelligence reports and other products
which are transmitted to the J-2 and to other locations via portable and fixed long-range
transmission systems, such as satellite communication (SATCOM), Non-secure Internet
Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET),
etc. The following procedures are applicable to every CMEC deployment:

a. Identification. Maneuver units identify and report suspected items of intelligence value
via SALUTE report. TECHINT teams may be dispatched to confirm identification of items
reported thru maneuver units. TECHINT teams will also execute preplanned missions to
strategic facilities and locations to identify items on the master requirements list.

b. Assessment. Once items have been identified, CMEC assess the CEM to determine its
overall intelligence value. System upgrades and modifications are analyzed to determine if
further exploitation is required.

c. Collection. CMEC personnel will inventory all identified items of interest. Items
determined to be of intelligence value will be transported either to the CAHA or CMEC.
Munitions will be marked for transportation to a CAHA and all other items will be marked for
transport to the CMEC. All items of interest will undergo limited in-place exploitation.

d. Exploitation. Exploitation efforts seek to determine technical properties of CEM. The
resultant exploitation reports are disseminated to the theater staff, DIA, and to appropriate
national intelligence production center dissemination.

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 V-5

e. Transmission and Distribution. TECHINT data is moved through the CMEC to national
intelligence centers within 24-48 hours to meet S&TI requirements. Figure V-1 depicts
TECHINT data flow from CMEC teams to national intelligence centers. CMEC teams can
deploy with limited stand-alone transmission capability via man-portable low data-rate satellite
transmission systems. Most TECHINT data is moved using theater-deployed communications
or fixed communications, such as NIPRNET and SIPRNET.

JCMEC

TECHINT Team

IECHEVT Team

TECHINT Team

DIALNO

(Technical

Advisor)

Combatant
Command

Defense Intelligence
Agency

NASIC

NGIC

MSIC

ONI

MCIA

■24-48 hours-

Figure V-1. TECHINT Data Flow

f. Evacuation. Evacuation of CEM is based on priorities established in the master
requirements list.

7. Forms Prescribed/Adopted

The form in this publication is adopted. For form designation and title, see table of
contents under figure E-1.

V-6

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

Appendix A
SAMPLE TECHINT APPENDIX TO AN INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

This appendix contains the example provided in FM 34-54, Technical Intelligence, 30
January 1998, Appendix D, and is extracted in its entirety.

This appendix provides examples of TECHINT input to an intelligence annex and
TECHINT-related tabs to that annex. The TECHINT appendix is used —

• As the primary example for the J-4/G-4 appendix on captured weapons.

• As the example for the J-1/G-1 appendix on equipment taken from EPWs.

THEATER ARMY INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

This example is tailored for a theater Army headquarters. All headquarters,
however, should include TECHINT operations input.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

2. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.

a. PIR:

(1) Does the enemy have significant quantities of night vision devices?

(2) Is there unusual or unexplained damage to US equipment and materiel?

(3) Have there been unexpected defensive and/or offensive capabilities of enemy
equipment?

b. IR: What are the capabilities and/or limitations of the AT-5 ATGM?

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS.

a. General: Capture of any enemy materiel will be immediately reported through
intelligence channels in accordance with priorities described below.

(1) 15th Corps. Priority of collection on foreign equipment is T-64B, AT-5, and SA-13.

(2) 25th Corps. Priority of collection on foreign equipment is BTR-70, BMP-I, and
individual protective vest (body armor).

(3) 23d Ml Brigade (EAC).

(a) 1st Battalion.

(b) 2d Battalion.

b. One TECHINT collection team and TECHINT liaison team to operate within each
corps area attached to each corps Ml brigade.

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 A-1

c. Screening and exploitation of captured IEW priorities described in FM 34-54,
Appendix B.

d. Fully integrate TECHINT operations and teams with IEW and EPW operations.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL.

a. Personnel.

b. Documents.

c. Materiel.

(1) All materiel will be reported in accordance with procedures and priorities
described in Appendix XXX, TECHINT.

(2) All materiel will be evacuated to the nearest collection point and held for
TECHINT screening in accordance with Appendix XXX, TECHINT.

(3) Items designated by TECHINT personnel as possessing intelligence value will be
evacuated to destinations designated by TECHINT personnel in accordance with priorities
described in Appendix XXX, TECHINT.

(4) No materiel will be diverted for other uses until screened and released by
TECHINT personnel.

5. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION. All equipment-related intelligence, SALUTE, and
EPW reports will include the J-2/G-2 and CMEC as an addressee.

JOINT THEATER TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE APPENDIX

This is an example of a joint theater TECHINT appendix. It shows how CEM must
be handled, reported, and its disposition.

Appendix XX, TECHINT, to Annex, Intelligence, to OPLAN/OPORD.

[This example does not include the tabs that are referenced and listed at the end.]
REFERENCES:

a. OPLAN

b. FM 34-54.

c. FM 3-19-1.

d. Chemical and Biological Sampling, Transport, and Evaluation Management
Procedures, dated February 1986.

1. PURPOSE: This appendix establishes policy and prescribes responsibilities and
procedures for the proper handling, reporting, intelligence assessment, and disposition of
CEM. Additionally, it establishes the procedures for the safe and expedient collection of
suspected CB agents to the laboratory for processing, analysis, and identification.

2. POLICY:

a. The J-2 controls and directs the theater captured materiel exploitation program. The
CMEC within the J-2 carries out exploitation activities.

A-2 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

b. The CMEC will be formed from elements of the 203d Ml Battalion (TECHINT),

Ml Brigade.

c. The J-2 exercises staff responsibility over the intelligence exploitation of CEM

throughout the area of operations and establishes requirements for evacuation of specific
items to CONUS for further exploitation. An LNE from the CMEC will be located in the J-2.

d. Commander, 203d Ml Battalion (TECHINT):

(1) Establishes the CMEC and attaches a TECHINT team to each Corps; positions
an LNE with the J-2, each Corps G-2, the theater Ml Brigade, and theater interrogation.

(2) In coordination with the Theater/Army Surgeon General, advises the J-2/G-2 on
all matters of CB sampling.

(3) Recommends a theater souvenir and war trophy policy in accordance with FM 34-
54, Appendix C.

e. The J-3:

(1) In coordination with the J-2, approves requests and assigns priorities for the issue
of CEM to US units engaged in special missions or training based on the following prioritized
uses of captured materiel:

(a) Intelligence.

(b) Special warfare.

(d) Issue to friendly forces.

(e) Internal defense.

(f) Substitutes or supplements to US equipment.

(g) Distribution to friendly foreign units or groups.

(2) Coordinates provisions of EOD support as required in the exploitation of CEM in
accordance with AR 75-15 and to fill requirements stated by the J-2.

(a) The J-4 exercises staff supervision over the evacuation and movement of
CEM of intelligence value in the theater to the CMEC and coordinates evacuation of high
priority items back to CONUS.

(b) The Staff Judge Advocate provides legal guidance concerning the
disposition of certain categories of enemy materiel, structures, and facilities.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. The CMEC is charged with the conduct and coordination of assessment of CEM
within the command. Support in the assessment of enemy naval and aerodynamic systems
and materiel will be provided by intelligence personnel from the Navy and Air Force
components attached to the CMEC. The scope of responsibilities include:

(1) Assign an LNE to the J-2, G-2, and the theater interrogation facility.

(2) Deploy TECHINT collection teams forward to each deployed Corps to conduct
preliminary screening of evacuated materiel and to respond to targets of opportunity which
cannot be processed in a normal manner.

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 A-3

(3) Receive/process validated intelligence requirements for items of enemy materiel.

(4) Participate in the technical interrogation of EPWs and assist in screening CEDs.

(5) Examine and evaluate TECHINT reporting and classification of CEM.

(6) Participate with target exploitation (TAREX) elements to fully integrate the
exploitation of specified C-E items.

(7) Participate with medical, CBRN, and special operations units for coordinating the
delivery of CB samples through Ml channels to the Army Medical Laboratory (AML).

b. Subordinate Commands:

(1) Each Corps will —

(a) Designate and operate collection points. Report locations of collection
points where CEM will be stored and amounts and types stored at each location. Forward
reports to Commander, CMEC, with an information copy to the J-2/G-2 and J-4/G4s. The
collection point will receive, store and, only upon direction, dispose or issue CEM.

(b) Designate and operate ammunition storage areas for the storage of
captured ammunition and explosive items, as required. Store captured chemical munitions
similarly to US chemical munitions. Report locations of ammunition storage areas and
amounts and types stored to commander, CMEC, with an information copy to J-2/G-2 and J-
4/G4.

(c) Provide necessary logistics support to evacuate CEM and CB samples
needed for intelligence operations, or other purposes, from collection points to the CMEC.

(d) Ensure all CEM is promptly tagged.

(e) Provide logistics and administrative support for all TECHINT assets
operating within their areas.

(2) CBRN reconnaissance units, special operations units, and medical units are
responsible for the transfer of CB samples to TEs or TECHINT collection teams at Corps, or
directly to the AML.

4. PROCEDURES:

a. Procedures for handling and processing CEM.

(1) The recovery and evacuation of CEM is a command responsibility at all levels.
The prescribed method of evacuation is through normal logistics channels and in
accordance with priorities established in Tab A and Tab B to this appendix.

(2) Enemy materiel captured by US military personnel is the property of the United
States and must be protected from pilferage, cannibalizing, and souvenir hunters.
Commanders at all levels will provide adequate security for CEM until it has been screened
by TECHINT personnel.

(3) Specific intelligence collection requirements and Top Ten End Item requirements
items of enemy materiel for which the tactical commander and intelligence agencies have a
need are listed at Tab A and Tab B to this appendix. These tabs will be published upon
execution of the OPLAN.

(a) When items listed in Tab A and Tab B or any of their updates are captured
or otherwise obtained, commanders will ensure that the acquisition is reported through

A-4 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

intelligence channels to the Corps TECHINT LNE to commander, CMEC, with an
information copy to J-2/G-2.

(b) Report as in (a) above (at a PRIORITY precedence) the capture of standard
types of foreign materiel that have been apparently modified in a major way or are having a
greater impact on combat operations than expected. These items will be evacuated to
COSCOM collection points by available backhaul capabilities on a PRIORITY basis.
Equipment will be held pending further disposition instructions from the J-2 through the
Corps TECHINT LNE.

(c) The capture of items listed in Tab A and Tab B will be reported by
IMMEDIATE precedence through intelligence channels and expeditiously evacuated to at
least the supporting collection point to await further disposition instructions from J-2.

(d) Report as in (a) above (at a ROUTINE precedence) all CEM. These items
will be evacuated to collection points by available backhaul capabilities on a space-available
basis. They will be held at the collection point until screened by TECHINT personnel.
Disposition will be per paragraph 4d below.

(e) The J-2, in coordination with the J-4, is the focal point for evacuation of key
items of intelligence interest to CONUS for national exploitation.

(4) The assessment of CEM below division and separate brigade levels will be
limited. Their primary responsibility is the recovery, reporting the capture, and initial
evacuation of enemy materiel from the capture location to the nearest collection point.
Exception is for medical supplies which will be handled through medical supply channels.
Significant items of CEM which cannot be evacuated, either because of the tactical situation
or due to their size, will be left in place and reported immediately.

(5) Assessment of CEM at division and separate brigade level is performed by
intelligence and operations personnel to the extent necessary to determine the immediate
tactical significance of the materiel. Assessment at this level does not replace the need for
detailed evaluation and analysis of CEM by technical specialists from the CMEC. For this
reason, the prompt evacuation of significant items of CEM must not be delayed.

(6) Screening and preliminary field assessment of CEM is performed by CMEC
TECHINT collection teams. These teams will operate in the Corps areas and are attached
to the Corps Ml Brigade. When required, these teams can also provide assistance to
capturing units. Assessment functions are normally carried out at the Corps support area
collection points. Items of intelligence interest or items needed to fill other requirements by
the CMEC are selected for evacuation. Selected items will be evacuated to the CMEC, or a
designated location, by collection point personnel through logistics channels.

(7) CEM evacuated to the CMEC is subjected to detailed examination and evaluation:

(a) Determine enemy materiel threats, performance capabilities, and limitations.

(b) Produce information from which countermeasures may be developed.

(d) Provide intelligence that can be of timely use to the tactical commander.

b. Materiel Requiring Special Handling.

(1) C-E Equipment. All CEM in this category must be evacuated immediately with
their dial settings, frequencies, and so forth, and recorded and sent to the supporting EW

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 A-5

unit by the quickest and most secure means possible. TECHINT and other specialized
personnel will evacuate this materiel to Corps support area collection points for screening.

(2) Ammunition and Explosives. The complete recovery and expeditious evacuation
of enemy ammunition and components is essential to the identification of known or new
enemy weapons systems and the threat posed by each. EOD teams are responsible for
preparing PRETECHREPs on first-time-seen enemy ammunition or explosives. If there are
no TECHINT personnel to assist in the area, EOD teams will also be responsible for
preparing COMTECH REPs.

(3) Medical Materiel. Medical materiel normally will not be destroyed. It will be left in
place if it cannot be evacuated. Handle in accordance with normal Class VIII procedures.

(4) Significant Items: All intelligence requirements specified in Tab A and Tab B will
be afforded special handling as described in paragraph 4a above.

(5) Technical Documents: Captured or recovered technical documents consist of
firing tables, logbooks, packing slips, and other documentation. If the tactical situation does
not permit the equipment to be evacuated, the documents will be forwarded to the CMEC
and will include a description of the equipment.

(6) CB Samples. See Tab D to this appendix.

c. Requirements.

(1) DIA provides national intelligence requirements for CEM to the theater. In-theater
intelligence requirements for enemy materiel are submitted through J-2 and G-2.

(2) In-theater operational and training requirements for other than Army subordinate
units are submitted through J-3 to the J-2 for review, approval, and assignment of priority.

(3) The intelligence requirements are published in Tab A and Tab B.

d. Disposition.

(1 ) Items required in support of operational requirements or for distribution to host
country forces will be separately designated by the J-3. Tab C to this Appendix describes
this equipment.

(2) Items determined to have no intelligence significance (J-2) and no operational
value (J-3) would then be identified and reported through logistics channels to the J-4.
Items will be retained within designated collection points for further disposition by the J-4.
No items will be released for war trophies until released by J-2.

e. Destruction. The destruction of CEM, excluding medical items, will be accomplished
only in the event that recapture is imminent, due to its location, or in those cases where
materiel is declared by EOD or TECHINT personnel to be hazardous to the safety of troops.
In the event destruction of materiel is necessary, all factory markings should be carefully
recorded and photographs taken, if possible, before the materiel is destroyed.
OFFICIAL:

TABS:

A = Top Ten Priority Items (TBP)

B = General Collection Requirements (TBP)

C = Equipment Releasable to Allies (TBP)

D = Chemical, Biological, and Biomedical Sampling

A-6 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

Appendix B
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

Note: This appendix contains the example provided in FM 34-54, Technical
Intelligence, 30 January 1998, Appendix E, and is extracted in its entirety.

This appendix describes the nine basic reports used by battlefield TECHINT analysts.

1. SALUTE report

2. Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECHREP)

3. Multi-Service Complementary Technical Intelligence Report (COMTECHREP)

4. Detailed Technical Report (DETECHREP)

5. Technical Intelligence Update Report

6. Technical Intelligence Summary (TECHSUM)

7. Technical Intelligence Report (TIR)

8. Special Technical Reports. These reports are generated in response to requests for
information. The formats vary by request and usually address a specific question or
requirement from a TECHINT consumer.

9. Other Equipment Information Reports. These reports focus on aspects of equipment
that do not necessarily relate to intelligence needs per se. For example, the theater
commander may have a war trophy policy that permits units to evacuate certain equipment
to their home stations for static displays. These reports may include driver's instructions,
handling considerations, render-safe procedures, and demilitarization standards for
equipment.

SALUTE (Size, Activity, Location, Unit/Uniform, Time, Equipment) REPORT

The SALUTE report is an oral or written report prepared by the acquiring units or
intermediate command echelons. It is used to report rapidly, by electrical or other means,
the capture of foreign materiel. These reports are forwarded to either the TECHINT LNEs at
Corps, other TECHINT LNEs, or directly to the CMEC. As a result of this information, a
TECHINT team could be dispatched or the CEM could be moved to the Corps CMEC or the
theater CMEC. An example of a completed SALUTE report is shown below.

SALUTE REPORT

TO: G-2 V Corps DTG: 230900Z Aug 98

FROM: G-2 24th Inf Div (Mech) REPORT NO: 07-0623

1.SIZE: NA.

2. ACTIVITY: Capture of shoulder-fired laser target designator by 1/64th Armor Bn 2d Bde
24th Inf Div (Mech) (include capturing unit).

3. LOCATION: Town of Al-Dahran (UTM EH556937) (as a minimum always give grid
coordinates).

4. UNIT: 3d Republican Guards Regiment (include enemy unit if known).

5. TIME: Item captured on 230230Z AUG 98 (always use ZULU time).

6. EQUIPMENT: One laser target designator and sighting device (give best possible
description).

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 B-1

PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL REPORT (PRETECHREP)

The PRETECHREP contains a general description of the CEE. It alerts the CMEC,
other technical elements, and the tactical units to significant technical information of
immediate tactical importance. It can also be used for reporting inventories at collection
points through intelligence channels so that location, quantities, and type of equipment can
be monitored. Below is an example of a PRETECHREP. Corps TECHINT teams and
possibly CMEC teams will prepare a PRETECHREP on all CEM after preliminary screening.
This report is first transmitted by radio directly to the Corps TECHINT LNE, from the
captured equipment site. It is then forwarded to the CMEC. The report will normally be
treated as unclassified during this transmission. The CMEC's technical analysts determine
what is of importance from the report and give the team instructions through the LNE on
what items need more detailed reporting or evacuation. During this time the team will collect
all documents off the CEE and will record the following on the PRETECHREP:

PRETECHREP

A. Type of equipment and quantity.

B. Date and time of capture.

C. Location (map reference).

D. Capturing unit and circumstances of capture.

E. Enemy formation from which captured and origin.

F. Brief description with serial numbers and, if possible, manufacturer.

G. Technical characteristics with an immediate value, including information or any
photographs available.

H. Time and origin of message.
I. Present location of CEE.

Things to consider when filling out a PRETECHREP:

• All radio frequencies of communication equipment.

• All serial markings of important equipment.

• The battle damage done to the CEE.

• These information requirements and actions will be taken at all CEE sites.

• The radio frequencies will be sent only by secured means.

COMPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT (COMTECHREP)

The COMTECHREP is categorized by types, depending on what type of CEE is
being reported. The COMTECHREP contains a more detailed description of the CEE than
the PRETECHREP. It alerts the CMEC, other technical elements, and the tactical units to
significant detailed technical information of immediate tactical and technical importance.

Corps TECHINT teams, and possibly CMEC teams, will prepare a COMTECHREP
on all CEM that the CMEC tells it to do. If the TECHINT collection team is out of contact
with the CMEC, it will follow the TECHINT collection plan and use its best judgment on
reporting.

B-2 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

This report is first transmitted normally by secure computer data transmission over
landline to the Corps TECHINT LNE from the team's base. If possible, it is transmitted from
the CEE site over secure computer or radio data transmission via satellite. It is then
transmitted to the CMEC. The report normally will be treated as classified during this
transmission. All electronic images of the CEE and computer scanning of critical CED will
be transmitted with the COMTECHREP. If data transmission is not on hand, the report will
be transmitted by the nearest message center at no less than PRIORITY precedence.

MULTI-SERVICE COMPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The MULTI-SERVICE COMTECHREP is used to report all items that are not
associated with explosive ordnance. This report is submitted as soon as possible. Below is
an example of a Multi-Service COMTECHREP.

MULTI-SERVICE COMTECHREP

A. Date found and location (map reference).

B. Type of equipment and quantity.

C. Origin.

D. Description with distinguishing marks (additional details).

E. Condition of equipment.

F. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value (additional details).

G. Recommended disposal.

H. Name plates photographed.

I. Photographs taken.

J. Other information.

K. Designation of TECHINT collection team doing this initial exploitation.

L. Time and origin of message.

COMTECHREP - TYPE B

The COMTECHREP - Type B is used to report information about explosive
ordnance. TECHINT teams prepare these reports, normally done by the EOD member of
the team. EOD companies will also prepare them in absence of TECHINT personnel or
when required by higher headquarters. This report must be as complete and detailed as
possible. EOD personnel prepare and send this report by the fastest means through an
EOD control unit. The CMEC coordinates with EOD battalions to receive copies of these
reports as soon as possible.

Note: Initial overall classification of EOD Reports. Non-nuclear
(COMTECHREP B) will be in accordance with OPNAVINST S5513.3B-24.1.

The initial classification of the COMTECHREP B with RSP is Confidential and will not
be released to non-US personnel without the written consent of Commanding Officer,
NAVEODTECHDIV.

A complete and accurate report is essential; lives of other EOD personnel rely on this
report, strive for the most complete report possible. However, when a detailed report might
result in serious delay and the items are of extreme significance, complete as much of the

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 B-3

report as possible. Items of EOD interest will at a minimum be photographed (with
electronic imaging systems if available), X-rays (digital) and have detailed drawings with
measurements (metric). Figure E-4 shows an example of a COMTECHREP - TYPE B.

The unit completing the report will distribute copies of the COMTECHREP - TYPE B
(EOD Report) to all deployed US EOD units and provide copies to:

Commander Commander

USATECHDET USAARDEC

2008 Stump Neck Road ATTN: AMSTA-AR-FSX

Indian Head, MD 20640 Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000

Commanding Officer Commander

NAVEODTECHDIV NGIC

2008 Stump Neck Road ATTN: IANGIC-RMS

Indian Head, MD 20640 220 7th Street, NE

Charlottesville, VA 22901-5396

COMTECHREP-TYPE B (EOD Report)

PRIORITY

FM: XXXX ORD CO (EOD)

TO: XXXX (JEODOC)

INFO: CDRUSATECHDET INDIAN HEAD MD

NAVEODTECHDIV INDIAN HEAD MD//

FSTC CHARLOTTESVILLE VA//AIFRCB/AIFIM//

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DT2C/DT-3B//

SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS

INVOLVED

SUBJ: COMTECHREP

REF A. MSG XXX SUBJECT: PRETECHREP

a. ( ) Date and location of acquisition, acquired by, and for whom.

b. ( ) Nationality, designation, and identification marks.

c. ( ) Description.

d. ( ) Overall length, including fuze, tail, vanes, or control surfaces and fittings;
measurement of various states (if there are several).

e. ( ) Maximum diameter of each state (if there are several).

f. ( ) Shape, design, and internal configuration (streamlining shells).

g. ( ) Span of vanes and control surfaces.

h. ( ) Number, relative positions, and dimensions (width, length, size, and/or
configuration of control surfaces),
i. () Thickness of casing at —

(1) ( ) nose.

(2) ( ) slides.

(3) ( ) base.

j. ( ) Type and materials of body and control surfaces.

B-4 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

k. () Color and markings of —

(1) ( ) nose.

(2) ( ) body.

(3) ( ) tail and vanes.
I. () Weight —

(1) ( ) total, including propellant.

(2) () of filling.

m. ( ) Nature of filling. If chemical or biological warfare in nature, give method of filling,

for example, bomblets or massive fill; specify method of delivery, such as spray,

roundburst, or airburst. For antitank missiles with high explosive antitank (HEAT)

warheads, give full details of cone-liner materials, cone angle, and diameter. For

antitank missiles with non-HEAT warheads, give full description of the warhead.

n. ( ) Type of missile guidance system and method of stabilization environment (control

and guidance radars, acquisition radar); frequencies used for reception response (in

case of a transponder); and proximity fuze (if there is one). Electronic countermeasures

and electronic counter-countermeasures equipment and/or chaff-dispensing equipment.

o. ( ) Sensors.

p. ( ) Diameter of radome and size of homing dish, if fitted.

q. ( ) Dimensions (internal and external) of wave guides in the homing head and wave

guides and/or aerials in the wings or body, and the technology used.

r. ( ) Homing head, transducer design, and shape and size (torpedoes).

s. ( ) Method of propulsion and propeller data (torpedoes).

t. ( ) Detonating system, fuzing system (nose, tail, or transverse) and firing mechanism

details.

u. ( ) Type of suspension, giving details of devices used, such as electrically operated

hoods or release gear.

v. ( ) Antihandling or booby-trap devices.

w. ( ) Other information (to include estimate of time required to prepare item for

shipment to TECHINT center or designated industrial firm for detailed analysis).

x. ( ) Name of officer in command of technical team making examination.

y. () Time and origin of message.

z. ( ) Energy used for mobile systems other than propulsions.

aa. ( ) Estimate of time required for completion.

Note: If feasible, a preliminary set of photographs should be sent with the report.

(Classification)

Note: The subject and each paragraph and subparagraph must be classified individually,
but not higher than the classification of the entire message.

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 B-5

NINE LINE UXO/IED SPOT REPORT

When mines, explosives, or other UXOs are found, report them to the unit's tactical
operations center (TOC) using the following format: An example of a Nine Line UXO/IED
Spot Report is shown below:

Nine Line UXO/IED SPOT Report

Line 1. Date-Time Group (DTG) the item was discovered.

Line 2. Reporting Activity (unit identification code) and location (grid of UXO).

Line 3. Contact Method: Radio frequency, call sign, point of contact, and telephone
number.

Line 4. Type of Ordnance: Dropped, projected, placed, or thrown. If known, give the
size of the hazard area and number of items. Without touching, disturbing, or approaching
(tripwire) the item, include details about size, shape, color, and condition (intact or leaking).

Line 5. CBRN Contamination: If present, be as specific as possible.

Line 6. Resources Threatened: Report any threatened equipment, facilities, or other
assets.

Line 7. Impact on Mission: Provide a short description of your current tactical situation
and how the presence of the UXO affects your status.

Line 8. Protective Measures: Describe any measures taken to protect personnel and
equipment.

Line 9. Recommended Priority (see table below): Recommend a priority for response by
EOD technicians or engineers.

Priority

Basis

Immediate

Stops the unit's maneuver and mission capability or threatens critical
assets vital to the mission.

Indirect

Slows the unit's maneuver and mission capability or threatens critical
assets important to the mission.

Minor

Reduces the unit's maneuver and mission capability or threatens
non-critical assets of value.

No Threat

Has little or no affect on the unit's capabilities or assets.

Table B-1. Priority Listings

B-6

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

DETAILED TECHNICAL REPORT (DETECHREP)

The DETECHREP normally is prepared at the CMEC by the Exploitation Company,
with the assistance of the national S&TI analysis personnel at the CMEC. The
DECTECHREP normally is classified. The CM&D section of the Exploitation Company
sends the DETECHREP to the national S&TI community. They also send a summary of the
report to theater units.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT

The TECHINT Update Report is a one- to two-paragraph report on an item of
equipment that has an impact on tactical operations. The report comes from information
provided in PRETECHREPs and COMTECHREPs, and is unclassified. The goal of the
report is to reach the lowest level — the Soldier — with information of value to the Soldier.
The CM&D section of the Operations Company sends the report by electronic message and
computer data transmission.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

The TECHINT Summary is a collection of information on more than one item of
equipment that has an impact on theater tactical operations. The information comes from
PRETECHREPs and COMTECHREPs from over a period of time or from a large CEE
location. The report normally is unclassified, but if put into an overall intelligence summary,
it can be classified. The CM&D section of the Exploitation Company sends the report by
electronic message and computer data transmission to the CMEC. The CMEC then makes
dissemination to the lowest possible level with JTF C I assets.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT (TIR)

The TIR is a critical report which goes to the highest levels of the intelligence
hierarchy. The report comes from information from PRETECHREPs, COMTECHREPs, and
DETECHREPs. This report is always classified and follows the format in DIAM 58-13. The
CM&D section sends TIRs by electronic message to the CMEC. The CMEC disseminates
them to the highest and lowest intelligence units and agencies possible.

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 B-7

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Appendix C
CHECKLISTS

1. Pre-Combat Checks

2. Pre-Combat Inspections

3. Photography

4. TECHINT Operations and Procedures

5. TECHINT Operations Checklist for Maneuver S-2

1. Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs)

PCCs are procedures for all individuals assigned to a convoy to determine if equipment
required for a mission is available and serviceable. PCCs are effective only if they are
organized and conducted using an up-to-date checklist. This section provides suggested
checklists for leaders, specialty teams and individuals. Use these checklists as a guideline.
The type of unit, equipment, operational area and mission will dictate additions, substitutions
and deletions. Follow through is essential, missing or unserviceable equipment must be
rapidly reported, repaired or exchanged. These checks should be scheduled soon after the
warning order is issued at a time where individuals are released from other duties.

2. Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs)

PCIs are the series of inspections scheduled early in the preparation sequence to insure
that all PCCs have been performed properly and that all vehicles, weapons,
communications, special and individual equipment are available and functional. These PCIs
are most effective when organized and conducted to exacting standards by first line
supervisors with systematic spot checks made by the senior convoy leadership.

FM 4-01.45, MCRP 4-11.3H, NTTP 4-01.3, AFTTP(I) 3-2.58, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations, has many checklists that may
be of value to a TECHINT team operating in a field environment.

3. Photography

Intelligence may be assisted by photographic methods. High quality pictures can
provide permanent records so that detailed interpretation of the collected data can be made.
Cameras record full details of the target instantly, and photographs should be made of all
targets worthy of observation. Two different types of TECHINT photography are usually
conducted.

• Base-line photography.

• Detailed photography.

a. Base-line photography: If possible, photographers should take shots from the eight
basic directions. Figure C-1 displays an example of using the eight basic directions against
a maritime target.

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 C-1

Figure C-1. Eight Basic Directions

b. Detailed Photography: Detailed photography involves photographic methods that
are more detailed and time consuming. Detailed photography collects information on
characteristics such as data plates, nomenclatures, and any other specific information of
intelligence value.

c. Photolog Diagram: The photolog diagram provides a description and location of a
target and information necessary for analysts to understand the photographer's location and
circumstances relative to the target. Generally, a photolog includes the following items (see
Table C-1 for an example):

(1) Line item.

(2) Date/time group (with the appropriate time zone designator).

(3) Description of the subject (object) being photographed.

C-2

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

(4) Location of the subject (preferably a GPS fix in lat long).

(5) Distance to the subject (from the photographer).

(6) Bearing to the subject (from the photographer). Make sure to denote magnetic or
true.

(7) Photograph naming/numbering convention(s).

(8) Environmental conditions.

(9) Traffic/egress/approach.

Date / Time

Description

Location

Distance

Bearing

061551ZDEC05

Mobile Scud Firing
Panel

BIAP(N33 15' 37"
E044 14' 3.9")

6 FT

360 deg M

061552ZDEC05

Mobile Scud
Hydraulic
Elevating System

BIAP(N33 15' 37"
E044 14' 3.9")

30 FT

270 deg M

Table C-1. Photolog Example

4. TECHINT Operations and Procedures

The following list provides TECHINT analysts at the team level with a basic guideline for
conducting initial on-site exploitation of CEM:

Mission preparation.

Link-up with supported unit.

Leader's reconnaissance.

EOD establishes safe entry and exit points and minimize hazards on target. No one

will enter the site until briefed by EOD on possible hazards.

Depending on the situation, CBRN analysts conduct chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) hazard analysis.

Other personnel will follow as required by the mission to conduct exploitation.

Base line photographs.

Measurements.

Specific exploitation.

Report findings to next higher command.

Prepare and evacuate CEM as directed.

Conduct battle damage assessment (BDA) as directed.

9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

C-3

5. TECHINT Operations Checklist for Maneuver S-2

TECHINT OPERATIONS CYCLE

S-2 SPECIFIC TASKS

TECHINT
TEMPLATING

Through all-source analysis,
CMEC template where items of
TECHINT interest are most likely
to be found on the battlefield.

Provide updated order of battle
information for specific area of
operations (AO) to next higher
echelon.

UNIT NOTIFICATION

Through operations channels
appropriate units are notified that
items may be within their AO.

Maintain updated captured
materiel (CM) TECHINT
requirements.

CAPTURE

Service member either captures
or observes an item of possible
TECHINT interest and does not
tamper with it.

Prior to all missions, ensure
Soldiers are educated on current
TECHINT requirements.
Provide enemy equipment
reference manuals/photos.
Maintain CEM tags and provide
them to Soldiers prior to missions.

SALUTE REPORT

SALUTE report is generated on
the CEM and forwarded to next
higher.

Check SALUTE report for
accuracy and ensure it is
forwarded.

SECURITY
COORDINATION

CEM MUST NOT be touched or
tampered with in any way until the
equipment is photographed or
positions recorded.

Coordinate with S-3 for security or
continued observation of the CEM
and ensure the item is not
tampered with in any way.

CAPTURE REPORT

Capture report is generated on
the CEM and forwarded to next
higher and EOD channels.

Generate capture report and
forward it to the next higher
echelon.

SEGREGATE

Items of potential interest will be
identified based on the TECHINT
collection requirements and
segregated from other CEM.

Segregate items of potential
interest based on the TECHINT
collection requirements from other
CEM.

DESTRUCTION

The capturing unit may be
ordered to destroy CEM.

Coordinate with S-3/S-4 for
organic evacuation of CEM.

TRANSPORTATION

The capturing unit may be
ordered to evacuate CEM with
organic equipment to next higher
echelon or temporary holding
area via backhaul.

Coordinate with S-3/S-4 for
organic evacuation of CEM.
Establish temporary holding area.

STORAGE

The capturing unit may be
ordered to safeguard the CEM
with organic assets until
TECHINT teams arrive.

Coordinate with S-3 for security or
continued observation of the CEM
for organic evacuation.

Table C-2. TECHINT Operations Checklist for Maneuver S-2

C-4

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

Appendix D
FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEXT RECOGNITION

Note: This appendix contains a portion of the example provided in FM 34-54,
Technical Intelligence, 30 January 1998, Appendix G.

When TECHINT personnel are able to correctly identify foreign languages used in
documents or equipment, it has two immediate benefits. First, it helps identify the
equipment or type of document and where or who is using it. Second, it ensures that
TECHINT personnel request the correct linguistic support.

This appendix contains language identification hints that will enable TECHINT
personnel to quickly identify some of the many languages used in documents, on equipment
plates, and on other materiel. TECHINT personnel can speed up the entire battlefield
TECHINT process by following the guidance herein.

The language identification hints were compiled by NGIC. There are thousands of
languages and dialects in use in the world today; therefore, this material is not complete.
The following include examples of the use of language identification during TECHINT
operations.

A TECHINT team discovers an ADA system that looks like a Russian ZPU-4 ADA
gun. But on closer examination, the technical analysis identifies Chinese characters on a
data plate and on the tires. This could mean that this ADA gun is from China, and this
observation needs to be reported to TECHINT elements and to the CMEC.

TECHINT personnel find a document in Arabic, but the country they are in speak and
write only Spanish. This document could be of intelligence value and would require being
reported to TECHINT elements and to document exploitation (DOCEX) personnel.

LANGUAGE SYSTEMS

The world's written languages can be divided into alphabet languages and character
languages. The only present-day character system is the Chinese system, which has been
borrowed by other languages. But there are many alphabets. The most important
alphabets currently in use are —

The Roman alphabet (used by English and many other languages).

The Cyrillic alphabet (used by Russian, some other Slavic languages, and most of

the minority languages of Russia).

The Arabic alphabet (used in the Middle East and other areas influenced by Islam).

Other alphabets exist, but their use is more restricted. (Figure D-1 shows some of

these spoken languages and some of the locations where they are spoken.)

The Hebrew alphabet for Hebrew and Yiddish; the Greek alphabet for Greek.

The Devanagari alphabet for Sanskrit and other languages of India.

In addition, there are special alphabets for languages like Georgian, Telugu, the

other Dravidian languages in southern India, Laos, and other languages in southeast

Asia, and Amharic in Ethiopia.

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 D-1

Illustrations of the main alphabets are normally available in standard desktop
dictionaries. Many unusual scripts are illustrated in Romanization Guides, revised and
enlarged edition, put out by the Office of the Geographer, Directorate for Functional
Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, and the US Board
on Geographic Names, dated 1 April 1972.

Reliable detailed information about foreign languages for people who cannot actually
read them is available in manuals compiled for professional librarians. These manuals can
be found at your local library.

Lanquaqe

Location

Chinese

People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand

English

United States, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, Australia,

New Zealand

Spanish

Spain, South America, Central America, Mexico

Hindi

North Central India

Russian

Soviet Union, Europe

Arabic

Saudi Arabia, Yemen, South Yemen, United Arab Emirates,

Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon,

Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco

Portuguese

Portugal, Brazil, Africa, Asia

Japanese

Japan

German

Germany, Austria, Switzerland

Urdu

Pakistan, India

French

France, Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, Morocco, Tunisia,

Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam

Korean

Korea, China, Japan

Italian

Italy, Switzerland

Vietnamese

Vietnam

Turkish

Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus

Persian (Farsi, Dari)

Iran, Afghanistan (Tadzhik, USSR)

Polish

Poland, United States, Soviet Union

Ukrainian

Ukrainian SSR

Rumanian

Romania, Moldavian SSR

Serbian (Croatian)

Yugoslavia

Pashto

Afghanistan, Northwest Pakistan

Czech (Slovak)

Czechoslovakia

Dutch

Netherlands, Suriname, Belgium

Hungarian

Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia

Danish (Norwegian) Denmark, Norway

Bulgarian

Bulgaria

Swedish

Sweden

Belorussian

Belorussian SSR

Finnish

Finland

Albanian

Albania, Yugoslavia

Lithuanian

Lithuanian SSR

Latvian

Latvian SSR

Slovenian

Slovenia (Northwest Yugoslavia)

Estonian

Estonian SSR

Macedonian

Macedonia (Yugoslavia)

Figure D-1. Partial List of Spoken Languages and Locations Where They Are Spoken

D-2

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

ROMAN ALPHABET LANGUAGES

The most complex language recognition problem is to distinguish between the numerous
languages that use the Roman alphabet. The 26-letter alphabet is used here as the basic
alphabet. The other Roman alphabet languages use these same letters, but many use
fewer than 26 and a few use more.

Unfortunately, just because a letter is not used is not a very useful language recognition
criterion. This is because it is difficult to know whether a letter is absent because it is never
used or because it simply was not needed to write the text in question.

Five of the letters <a, e, i, o, u> are referred to collectively as "vowels," while the rest are
called collectively "consonants." The rules designating letters as vowels or consonants vary
from language to language. Some languages, for instance, consider <l>, <r>, or <y> to be
vowels. Most of the Roman alphabet languages modify letters by putting extra marks
above, in, or below them. These marks are called diacritics. They are among the best
criteria for language recognition.

DIACRITICS

A diacritical mark or diacritic, sometimes called an accent mark, is a mark added to a
letter to alter a word's pronunciation or to distinguish between similar words. A diacritical
mark can appear above or below the letter to which it is added, or in some other position;
however, note that not all such marks are diacritical. For example, in English, the tittle (dot)
on the letters i and j is not a diacritical mark, but rather part of the letter itself. Further, a
mark may be diacritical in one language, but not in another; for example, in Catalan,
Portuguese or Spanish, u and u are considered the same letter, while in German, Estonian,
Hungarian, Turkish or Azeri they are considered to be separate letters.

The main usage of a diacritic is to change the phonetic meaning of the letter, but the
term is also used in a more general sense of changing the meaning of the letter or even the
whole word.

1. Types of Diacritic

The following are types of diacritic:

' ) anunaasika superdot

. ) anusvaara subdot, used in Sanskrit

4 ) cedilla

c ) ogonek or "Polish hook"

) krouzek or ring; unlike in Czech, in the Scandinavian languages this is not
considered a diacritic but an integral part of the character a.

) breve; part of the character when used in Esperanto

) caron or hacek ("little hook" in Czech). In Slovak it is called makceh ("softener" or
"palatalization mark"), in Slovenian stresica ("little roof"), in Croatian kvacica ("little
hook").

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 D-3

( A ) circumflex, part of the character when used in Esperanto, also in Slovak is used on
"o" and it is called vokah

) macron

) diaeresis (also dieresis) or umlaut, a diacritic in some languages (such as German),
but part of the character in the Swedish and Russian languages.

) grave accent

) acute accent

) double acute accent

) spiritus asper or rough breathing mark

) spiritus lenis or smooth (or soft) breathing mark

Marks that are sometimes diacritics, but also have other uses, are:

| ) bar through the basic letter

, ) comma

~ ) tilde

" ) titlo, used to indicate abbreviation in the early Cyrillic alphabet

' ) apostrophe

: ) colon, used to attach native affixes (such as case markers) to foreign words and
abbreviations

( - ) hyphen - in English, hyphens can be used to break words between syllables, to
resolve ambiguities in pronunciation

2. Usage

a. Catalan has grave, acute, cedilla and diaeresis.

b. Several Chinese romanizations use umlaut, but only on u (u). In Hanyu Pinyin, the
four tones of Mandarin Chinese are denoted by the macron, acute, caron and grave
diacritics.

c. Czech has acute, caron and ring.

d. Dutch uses diaeresis. For example in mine it means that the u and i are separately
pronounced in their usual way, and not in the way that the combination ui is normally
pronounced. Thus it works as a separation sign and not as an indication for an alternative
version of the i. Diacritics can be used for emphasis (erg koud for very cold) or for
disambiguation between the numeral one (een appel, one apple) and the indefinite article
(een appel, an apple). Grave and acute accents are used on a very small number of words,
mostly loanwords.

e. In Estonian, carons in s or z may appear only in foreign proper names and
loanwords, but may be also substituted with sh or zh in some texts. Apostrophe can be
used in declension of some foreign names to separate the stem from any declension

D-4 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

endings; e.g., Monet' or Monet'sse for the genitive case and illative case, respectively, for
(the famous painter) "Monet".

f. French uses grave, acute, circumflex, cedilla and diaeresis. However, not all
diacritics occur on all vowels in French:

g. Acute (accent aigu) only occurs on e (e, pronounced lei)

h. Grave (accent grave) occurs on e (e, pronounced Id), a (a), and u (u)

i. Circumflex (accent circonflexe) occurs on all vowels: e (e, pronounced Id), a (a,
pronounced Id), i (T), o (6, pronounced lot), and u (u; if occurring in the combination eu,
pronounced I0I)

j. Cedilla (cedille) is used only under the c (c, pronounced 1st). It is used in cases in
which a c is soft before a, 0, or u, such as ga (pronounced /sa/, not /ka/).

k. Diaeresis (trema) occurs on e (e), i (1), u (ii), and y (y). The diaeresis only occurs on
y in a few proper nouns, including Louys and L'Hay-les-Roses. The mark's function is to
indicate that the vowel is pronounced separately from the one just before it.

I. Diacritics are sometimes omitted from capitalized letters, especially in France.

m. Not all French diacritics affect pronunciation. However, all cases in which they do
have been noted in the foregoing.

n. Finnish uses a colon to decline loanwords and abbreviations; e.g., USA:han for the
illative case of "USA". Also characters a and 6 are part of the Finnish alphabet (a and with
Umlaut).

0. German has the Umlaut ("). This can be used over a, 0, or u to indicate vowel
modification. For instance: Ofen (/'o:fan/); Ofen (/'0:fan/), which in this case makes the
difference between singular and plural ("oven"/" ovens"). The sign originated in a superscript
e; a handwritten Sutterlin e resembles two parallel vertical lines, like an umlaut.

p. Irish uses acute accent to indicate that the vowel is long. It is known as sineadh fada
in Irish.

q. Italian uses acute and grave to indicate irregular stress patterns (as in piu, which
would otherwise be stressed on the i) and to distinguish words that would otherwise be
homographs (such as te ["you"] and te ["tea"]). In many words, acute and grave are
interchangeable.

r. Romanized Japanese (Romaji) uses diacritics to mark long vowels. The Hepburn
romanization system uses a macron to mark long vowels, and the Kunrei-shiki and Nihon-
shiki systems use a circumflex.

s. Lithuanian uses the acute, grave and tilde in dictionaries to indicate stress types in
the language's pitch stress system. In general usage, where letters appear with the caron
(c, s and z) they are considered as separate letters from c, s or z and collated separately;
letters with the ogonek (3., Q, [ and u_), the macron (u) and the superdot (e) are considered as
separate letters as well, but not given a unique collation order.

t. Portuguese uses acute (to mark stressed vowels), grave (to mark the assimilation of
two identical vowels into one, now used only on A), circumflex (marks both the stress and
the roundness, being deprecated in this second use), cedilla (to mark the pronunciation of C
as Is/ instead of /k/ before A, O and U and tilde (to mark the nasalisation of A and O). In
Brazil diaeresis is also used to differ the pronunciation of groups like que and gui
(respectively /kwe/ and /gwi/) from que and gui (Ike/ and /gi/).

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 D-5

u. Many Slavic and Baltic languages use caron to signify either palatalisation or
iotation.

v. Many Slavic languages that use the Latin alphabet have ogonek and bar.

w. Slovak has acute, caron, circumflex (only above o) and diaresis (only above a).

x. Spanish uses acute, diaeresis and tilde. Acute is used on a vowel in a stressed
syllable in words with irregular stress patterns. It can also be used to "break" a diphthong as
in tfo (pronounced /'tio/, and not /tjo/ as it would be without the accent). Moreover, the acute
can be used to distinguish words that otherwise are spelt alike, such as mas ( = "but"} and
mas ( = "more"), and also to distinguish interrogative and relative words otherwise spelt
alike, such as donde/^donde? ( = "where") or como/^como? ( = "as'V'how?"). Tilde is used
on n, forming a separate letter (fi) in the Spanish alphabet. Diaeresis is used only over u (u)
so that it is pronounced /w/ in the combinations gue and gui (where u is normally silent), for
example ambiguedad. In poetry, diaeresis may be used on i and u as a way to force hiatus.

y. Tagalog uses a hyphen after a consonant to indicate a syllable break (nag-alis
/nag-a-lfs/ as opposed to nagalis /na-ga-lfs/). A hyphen is not necessary between two
vowels, vowels being distinctly pronounced in Tagalog (tauhan /ta-u-han/, buo /bu-6/).

z. Tamil does not have any diacritics in itself, but uses the Western numerals 2, 3 and 4
as diacritics to represent aspirated, voiced, and voiced-aspirated consonants when the
Tamil script is used to write to long passages in Sanskrit.

aa. Turkish uses a G-breve (G), a diaeresis on two vowels (O and 0) to represent
rounding, a cedilla on two consonants (C and S, to represent the affricates /tS/ and /S/) and
also possesses a dotted capital i (and a dotless lowercase i). Turkish considers each of
these a separate letter, rather than a modification of existing characters, however; see
Turkish alphabet for more details.

bb. Vietnamese uses acute (dau sac), grave (dau huyen), tilde (dau nga), dot below (dau
nang) and hook (dau hoi) on vowels as tone indicators.

cc. Welsh uses the circumflex, diaeresis, acute and grave accents on its seven vowels
a, e, i, o, u, w, y. The most common is the circumflex (which it calls to bach, meaning "little
roof) to denote a long vowel, usually to disambiguate it from a similar word with a short
vowel. The rarer grave accent has the opposite effect, shortening vowel sounds which
would usually be pronounced long. The acute accent and diaeresis are also occasionally
used, to denote stress and vowel separation respectively. The w-circumflex and y-
circumflex are among the most common accented characters in Welsh, but unusual in
languages generally, and were until recently very hard to obtain in word-processed and
HTML documents.

dd. Modern English does not usually have diacritics, which appear only in foreign and
loanwords. The letter e is an exception, used to modify the pronunciation of words ending in
-ed within poetry and songs.

D-6 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

CYRILLIC ALPHABET LANGUAGES

The Cyrillic alphabet is used to write Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and many minority
languages from the former Soviet Union. It is also used to write Bulgarian and Serbian. The
Cyrillic alphabet and the Roman alphabet are both derived from forms of the Greek alphabet
so there is a general resemblance. Some Cyrillic letters seem to Americans to be
backwards or oddly shaped. Figure D-2 shows the characters and diacritics not found in
Russian. With the exception of one letter, which is only used sometimes in Russian, none of
these letters appear in the normal Russian text.

r h% T. Rl II RARIAN*

-■ 6 e, I i, 1 i UKRANIAN

'■ T rV ^ RFI nPII99 IAM

^ 1), J j f 3B 3b, B. h, IJ. y SERBIAN

This letter appears frequently in Bulgarian and rarely in Russian

Figure D-2. Distinguishing Major Slavic Languages From Russian

SLAVIC LANGUAGES

TRANSLITERATION:

Figure D-3 shows the different forms of the Cyrillic alphabet for five principal Cyrillic
alphabet languages and the recommended transliterations for each letter. Pay particular
attention to the transliteration of Russian. These equivalents must be used when reporting
on materiel bearing Russian nameplates. DO NOT REPORT ON FOREIGN EQUIPMENT
AND DOCUMENTS USING THE ORIGINAL CYRILLIC CHARACTER. The figure classifies
each letter as "C" for consonant or "N" for nonconsonant.

NOTE: In the following discussion, the letters are referred to by their numbers on the chart
in Figure D-3. For example, a letter used often in Russian and never in Bulgarian is the
letter 39; however, the way to be sure that it is not Bulgarian is to see if the letter 38 comes
before a consonant or "C" letter. Note that letter 38 is frequent in Bulgarian and rare in
Russian; moreover, when letter 38 occurs in Russian, it always occurs before an "N" letter.

RUSSIAN: Russian is the most frequently encountered Cyrillic alphabet language and
should always be the prime suspect. The key to recognizing Russian is the fact that it uses
both letter 12 and letter 39 and does not use letter 13 at all.

BULGARIAN: Bulgarian is perhaps the second most frequently encountered Cyrillic
alphabet language and the most difficult for the nonspecialists to differentiate from Russian.
Bulgarian uses fewer letters than Russian.

Proper transliteration is very important. When an analyst reads a Russian nameplate
and writes down P-105A, but it is actually an R-105D (P is not P, rather "R," and <> is
wrongly symbolized by A); then it results in incorrect reporting.

9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

D-7

The column in Figure D-3 marked "Other" is not supplied with any transliteration
equivalents. This column contains similar letters that are encountered in the written
languages of various minority nationalities in the former USSR. These languages belong
mainly to the Uralic family or the Altaic family, and a Russian linguist will be unable to make
any sense out of them. Recognition of any documents in these languages as non-Slavic is
a helpful first step in DOCEX.

NO.

Russian

Ukrainian

Balorussi

an Bulgarian, Sarbian

other

1. H

Ai Aifi

3. C

G<S

B 6

lit

3. C

II u

U u

l)u

a ii

4. C

r r

TrEi

5- C

Ha,

Ha.

iia

6. C

Tju

7. N

•Vy*

E c

•

a/ya

E e

E c

Etas

0. N

S/yS

•Vy*-

9. N

e c

y«

10. c

MCm

>Kw

)Kui

)Kw

**HU

11. C

3 3

3 j

3 3

3 a

3i 3?

12. N

Hit

Hi,

B»H«

13. N

ll 11

It. N

IS. C

flu

Af,

Is. C

17. C

K«

KkKk

18. C

JlJl

JIji

n«

lin

Ait

Ah,

19. C

Ibn,

20. C

Mu-

21. C

tt ii

Hnitwiirir

22. C

Ibib

«3

23. H

o e.8«

24. C

11 ii

II ii

11 ii

25. c

p P

^ P

26. C

•

27. C

28 C

Ull

29. H

*»

*y*»y»

30. C

•

Vj V» Vw

31. C

<J>*

lt»o

<f>«l>

<!>4>

«4>«p

32. C

Xx.

33. C

Utt

t»

Utt

34. C

4 i

4 1

HlH-iH,,

35. C

h H

36. C

Ului

«h

Ului

Ulu

Ului

dim

37. C

lUWL

inch

Him

inch

lUw

aht

3B. H

■

T.1.

39. H

40. H

b k

■

b fa

•

b k

■

41. H

•

42. N

IOiu

lOio

IOiu

43. N

y«

JI«

y«

»«

tin

y«

Figure D-3. Cyrillic Alphabet and Transliteration Chart

D-8

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

NOTES:

1. The letters are numbered sequentially for ease of reference. The
alphabetic order given is the convenient one, which is not necessarily the
traditional one.

2. The letters marked "N" are nonconsonants; and the letters marked "C"
are consonants.

3. Letters 7 and 8 have alternate transliterations for Russian and
Belorussian. In all cases, the first transliteration is used when the letter
occurs after a "C" letter; the second transliteration is used in all other
cases, including when the letter begins the word.

4. Letter 8 is not considered a separate letter and its dieresis is often
omitted.

5. Letter 4 is pronounced something like "h" in Ukrainian and Belorussian
and "h" is often the recommended transliteration. However, transliteration
"g" is recommended here to eliminate confusion with the letters
transliterated "sh" and "zh."

6. The "Other" category refers to various minority languages in the
Soviet Union, many of which are Uralic or Altaic languages.

Figure D-3. Cyrillic Alphabet and Transliteration Chart (continued).

UKRAINIAN: Ukrainian is distinguished by the use of letters 12 and 13 and the non-use of
letter 39. Letters 9 and 14 also are unique to Ukrainian, but their frequency is low and their
absence may be accidental. When Ukrainian is identified, pay particular attention to the
transliteration of letter 12. The recommended transliteration for letter 4 is "g" even though its
pronunciation is closer to English "h."

BELORUSSIAN: Belorussian is distinguished by the use of letters 13 and 39 and the non-
use of letter 12. Letter 30 is unique to Belorussian, but its frequency is not high enough to
use it as an identification sign. As in Ukrainian, letter 4 in Belorussian is transliterated "g"
and pronounced like "h."

SERBIAN: Serbian is spotted easily by the several unique letters it uses: letters 6, 16, 19,
22, 28, and 35. Serbian is conventionally transliterated into Croatian, and this is what the
chart gives. The diacritics of the Croatian script are discussed in the "ROMAN ALPHABET
LANGUAGES" section above.

MACEDONIAN: Macedonian is spoken by perhaps two million people in southeastern
Yugoslavia. The Macedonian alphabet is similar to the Serbian, except that letters 6 and 28
are not used and three other letters are added.

ARABIC ALPHABET LANGUAGES

The Arabic alphabet has generally followed the spread of Islam and has been used to
write numerous languages, some of which (notably Turkish) no longer use it. This alphabet,
appropriately modified, currently is used for all the dialects of Arabic and for Persian, Urdu,
and other Indo-lranian languages, such as Dari, Pashto, and Kurdish. The Russian and
Cyrillic alphabets seem even more related to one another when compared to Arabic.

9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

D-9

ARABIC AND PERSIAN: The best distinction a nonlinguist can make is to separate
Persian documents from Arabic documents. Persian linguists cannot read Arabic, and vice
versa, unless they know both languages.

ARABIC: Arabic is spoken over a large area extending from Morocco on the west to
borders of ancient Persia (modern Iran) on the east. The spoken language varies widely in
this area, but the written language is fairly standard. Only a specialist could hope to
distinguish the varieties of Arabic, but a sharp-eyed nonlinguist can learn to recognize
Arabic and distinguish it from Persian. The best indication is perhaps the presence of letter
32, which is not used in Persian. A final characteristic is the absence of the special Persian
letters: letters 3, 7, 14, and 26. Since this is a negative indication, however, it cannot be
used by itself to prove that a text is Arabic.

PERSIAN: Persian is used in Iran. It is indicated by the presence of the special Persian
letters 3, 7, 14, and 26, and by the absence of letter 32. Other indications are a paucity of
letter 1 and 27 combinations (the Arabic definite article) and a slightly different preference in
numeral usage.

ARABIC NUMERALS: In school, the numerals used in the United States and most of the
rest of the world are often called "Arabic numerals," but these are not the same forms used
in Arabic alphabet languages. The real Arabic numerals are illustrated in Figure D-4. This
figure also shows Arabic and Persian variants of the numerals along with their international
equivalents. Unlike the Arabic alphabet (which is, of course, read from right to left), ARABIC
NUMERALS ARE READ FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, THE SAME WAY AS OUR OWN
NUMERALS ARE READ.

International

Arabic

Persian

International

Arabic

Persian

♦

o or ♦

F or 1

r ott

\ ♦

)o or )♦

6 or o

T ♦

To orT*

Figure D-4. International, Arabic, and Persian Numbers

Document collectors should familiarize themselves with the Arabic numerals so they can
read page numbers in collected documents and properly reassemble documents that have
come apart. Collectors should remember that one of the results of the right-to-left
orientation of the Arabic alphabet is that the apparent "back" of a document is actually the
front.

Figure D-5 illustrates the Arabic alphabet in its Arabic and Persian variants. Notice that
each letter has four forms, labeled "alone," "final," "medial," and "initial." Notice that "initial"
is to the right of "final." These column labels indicate two of the main differences between

D-10

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

Arabic script and Roman script: First, the letters change in order to connect to other letters,
and second, THE SCRIPT IS WRITTEN FROM RIGHT TO LEFT. The letters with asterisks
by their numbers cannot connect to a following letter. The initial form is used to begin a
word or when the letter follows a nonconnectable letter. The medial form is used after a
connectable letter or when it is used by itself; for example, to letter paragraphs in a
document.

No.

Arabic

Persian

Alone

Final Medial

Initial

Alone Fin

al Med

tal

Initial

V_»

;

i_j

U--

•

;

c»

;

tii

ii.

a»

>»

7 .

j»

»«

■M

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

IS.

16.

i/ -

•s

17.

■*

•*

18.

*».

-i

v*.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

i_j

i_t

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

•4

29.

30.

31.

•

32.

•

—

33.

Figure D-5. The Arabic Alphabet

DIACRITICS: Another feature of the Arabic alphabet is the use of diacritics to differentiate
many of the letters. Figure D-6 illustrates the diacritics used in Arabic and Persian.

9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

D-11

< * > High Dot

<•*> High Double Dot

< •"• > High Triple Dot

< , > Low Dot

< ,, > Low Double Dot

< « > Low Triple Dot

<"> Flag High

< ^> Double Flag High

< j > Hamza Sign Persian

< ^ > Flag Low

<^, >Double Flag Low

< » > Hamza Sign Arabic

Figure D-6. The Diacritics of Arabic and Persian

SAMPLES OF ARABIC AND PERSIAN

Figure D-7 gives a sample of printed Arabic. Note the frequent occurrences of letter 1
and letter 27: the definite article at word beginnings. Remember, words begin on the right.
The seventh line from the top, for instance, has four obvious occurrences and two other
occurrences in modified forms that have not been discussed here. There are 18
occurrences of letter 32, at least one occurrence in every line except lines 9 and 1 1 and four
occurrences in lines 3 and 8.

^* I ^ lM ^ Qj* uilU- <J j_^Lll jl^l jl L5" _ i JJy -i]l JL*t ^ ^u*

VI U -JJI iJU j* j ol>l J-i' j[ ^jijtl fa r jt* J* ^- ji\ j^jf

. UjV .U-l jlS Ju»3 II* jt c-

Figure D-7. Printed Arabic

Figure D-8 illustrates typewritten Arabic. Note that lines 1,25, and 10 begin (on the
right) with the definite article (letter 1 and letter 27). There are 20 other obvious occurrences
of these letters at the beginning of words and several others that are less obvious. Lines 1 ,
2, and 9 end (on the left) with letter 32. Letter 32 occurs five other times in the sample.
Arabic script permits some letters to be stretched in order to even out text on the left. The
long lines at the left of the sample are instances of this.

D-12

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

-L,

jr***^? «4-*J (j^'^-^J ' «i»»*

'>*' o

iLL^itiJ!

3 il ■' ■ - HI ,ji f ( jJ > J* j-aj ^l-n^l JJLfcill

t - <lM < > ». ^ u* b t> \ To - t T t - YY j'jJL,

"^ w > • - I I %. ~ If - J— J

Figure D-8. Typewritten Arabic

Figure D-9 illustrates printed Persian. Note the double flags, two in the first line and
eight more in the rest of the sample. Note the low triple dots, one in the first line and eight
more in the rest of the sample. Neither of these diacritics occurs in Arabic.

O^J ^^JCI jV .ua JjUT JUT , . r A JL. j i «ifj> # ^U .Li jl joo
|.L»J J ^=— 1 '^ Jj x^f iSj Oi^J** J*> »t-S jl Aij) ojU" v Lj j,j .jL
jJIj.j jb oljj, tZjS' J-^ ^j, ^U .Li jLj jj aT Ij J^L. j oljL>|
, . ri c>U£ .L ji ^l .LijL Jjl ^jU o J» jl a£T I. j Ji,jT c~Jo
•J'jl' J-* a- 5 ^' ^JJ 1 ^ oAtL- j clLJ'tjIj. a^U j.XjLJ ( nr .)
^-j j j'OJ r jLjlil CrJ yj^. ^ oljil «L:jIj sJj± jl j JuT Jv, .Li ^Ijf
jl* ^-Jj jUI OjU ^ c — i C-U.JLs.alf u-J jLj jJ Jj JL5. **-!
i-Li ^^Xl J^ j.^*, cSjL* dif" t5lj». Jjl ;JjU. £±* j'«i j ^ ^-id*
^JL^ ^J* *-U ui' f i£>V 'LsiL o> jl j Jt-j i J*, .Li c5 Ij, r Cj

Figure D-9. Printed Persian (Arrows indicate distinguishing features.)

OTHER ARABIC ALPHABET LANGUAGES

DARI: Dari is used in Afghanistan and favored by the government. Since its written
form is heavily influenced by Persian models, there is no easy way for the nonspecialist to
distinguish it from Persian.

KURDISH, PASHTO, AND URDU: The other notable Arabic alphabet languages are
Kurdish, Pashto, and Urdu. Kurdish is spoken by the Kurdish tribes of Iraq, Iran, and
Turkey. Pashto is used widely in Afghanistan, and Urdu is the predominant language of
Pakistan. These languages contain letters and diacritics not listed for Arabic or Persian. If
one of these languages is suspected, refer the problem to a linguist.

9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

D-13

CHARACTER LANGUAGES

Character languages use writing systems with symbols that stand for words or
meaningful elements of words rather than for sounds. Character languages, such as
hieroglyphic Egyptian, existed in earlier times; but today, the only character languages are
Chinese and languages that have wholly or partially borrowed the Chinese system, such as
Japanese and Korean.

DISTINGUISHING CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND KOREAN

The easy way to distinguish the three languages is to look for the distinctive phonetic
symbols of Japanese and Korean. If these symbols are not present, conclude that the
language is Chinese. Chinese is the model for the other two, and these languages borrow
freely from Chinese. Figures D-10, D-11, and D-12 give sample texts of Chinese, Japanese,
and Korean.

Figure D-10 shows Chinese characters. They are more detailed, complex, and square
or precise than Japanese or Korean. Korean and Japanese language texts use Chinese
characters whenever it might be unclear to use one of their own symbols. This means that
the higher or more academic a text is the more Chinese characters it will have.

Hi is a w

( Nane> Hodes) #1JQ73Sil£i*:rft. SflrtXfcT«fcWfflttffi*t!l*ft. *XH. £»«.

k&a. sa, *xr. «a«. ***, *5tt. *nia. iMf* 4«w»5iffl«f. a»

l>Jj£^|i|( EUie Fairfax-Cholmeley) , |f)fi»( Norman Shuiraan) *13S3i££*>tf;*:-1S6<jg3Wfll

**Je-«+sa"i8XI*»B. aHJftBHS*?*!!***. «1»fctttt#»l»**?, ttA»

■mrwjwk a«c-ifc»aMxir«iiS. *». *». sw. i»aa*tt*«ttfc«f*w*

Figure D-10. Sample of Chinese Text

D-14 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

ill O ft

& u m m <o ft

<l r *>*«•* noaafc^ftT. ut s*f,i *>» us ci k (t v -esc^T <o ^i o i* «aiit l *f id t*j • msanaimr

Figure D-11. Sample of Japanese Text

+■! M-^ xsvn BiBaJE^ 43-1- 444 #jt7i- ^pj r**£nwej ot 20^ ts&*
n±a. **& ls-dtt -am- ?ii-«i sh * r*+<k tts*itAj* ajfwn °i-5-a*M4. •)
r*+ «u 8x*rajsj 4# ah<a^ -a* *^« *H4 44* a# « wa+ *«■ »as) *
a#a-§-M4.

■f )? 5 !^-^, ^Ms4 fl* *tt4*44 i44 ??}$ 4*'*J*-44:&*V*RHI4A'*lfc

filji 4*t4 I"£ttj4 r»£JS] "f- 4*1 rflA^S] 444.fr e^ ^^-otMli ^itf ^ tf Q *

^4i)4 -M U^-S. ^ 4H*il4 tl:4te tt*B*44a. -M 1973«sH r*-¥-4£. £»±B*U+
m^a. ^ q »**-§- :Hf-4 154*1 ^ *«* °)44 3-4 ^s- sm riME±»*j4 i^-8-

£-°H 3SI-8-M4. +3 4*1 i^. j.4-g. KIS4-S: £&£■ ftrlfe, <%£. fljfM4 4f-3lfc 44
*MM3ll*M r8£*8Mj°) rjS»*IWJ -S-4 54°14 *I44>« 4 4 AM 4.

Figure D-12. Shows Korean with Fewer Chinese Symbols Used

NOTE: North Korean text seldom has any Chinese characters as a matter of official
policy.

CHINESE: Chinese is written with several thousand symbols called characters.
International numerals are widely used and scientific and technical Chinese will contain
quoted European words in Roman letters. The characters are constructed according to a

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01. 4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 D-15

complex system based on the use of only a few different stroke types (less than 10) and a
large set of elements called "radicals" (about 200). Radicals are made up of one or more
elements associated with them. These radicals and strokes are used to construct the
characters. The characters are thought of as occupying a rectangular space and good
calligraphy allots about the same area to each character, regardless of complexity.

Figure D-13 shows the 50 most common radicals in Chinese. Some will occur by
themselves as characters. Most will more frequently occur as constituents of more complex
characters. The People's Republic of China has recently changed the form of some of these
elements, but most are unchanged and the traditional forms still occur even there. Except
for numerical zeroes and the small circles that are used as punctuation marks to indicate the
end of a sentence, printed Chinese does not have any circles. If the text has a lot of circles
and curves, suspect some language other than Chinese.

109

120

149

[163]

181

[94|

112

1130]

154

167

[184]

196]

115

IH0]

157

169

187

[61]

[85 )

102

Ftfr

118

111

142

159

(170]

195

□

104

119

[145|

(162)

173

196

Figure D-13. The Fifty Most Common Chinese Character Radicals

JAPANESE: Japanese has a mixed writing system. Like the Chinese, the Japanese
normally use international numerals in their S&T literature; but this is not the real reason
their writing system is mixed. Japanese writing is mixed because, in general, it uses
Chinese characters to write the lexical stem of nouns and verbs (the part of the word that
conveys the basic meaning); and a set of phonetic symbols invented in Japan called
hiragana to write the grammatical affixes of the nouns and verbs as well as entire auxiliary
words.

Japanese also use another set of phonetic symbols, also invented in Japan, called
katakana to write words borrowed from European languages. The presence of these
katakana symbols distinguishes Japanese. Normal prose will contain perhaps 60 to 70
percent hiragana symbols. Unlike Chinese characters, hiragana are written with curved
strokes. Katakana are less frequent.

The hiragana are illustrated in Figure D-14 and the katakana are illustrated in Figure D-
15. Pay particular attention to the fifth symbol from the left in the bottom row of the hiragana

D-16 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 9 June 2006

(Figure D-14), the one labeled "no." This symbol is used to write a very common
grammatical affix. It will almost always occur frequently in any Japanese text.

h a

■fr ka

5 sa

ft ta

% na

52 ha

i; ma

^ya

£3 ra

fa wa

§ ki

L shi

£> chi

\Z ni

O hi

<^ mi

I My)'

c£> wi

9 u

< ku

T su

Otsu

S& nu

^i fu

tJ mu

KJ)yu

h ru

1 (w)u

it ke

■^ se

Tte

fa ne

^ he

56 me

fc(y)e

fa re

^ (w)e

d ko

%: so

Eto

CO no

U ho

& mo

X yo

-5 ro

£ (w)o

A> n

Figure D-14. The Japanese Hiragana Syllabary

Figure D-15. The Japanese Katakana Syllabary

KOREAN: Korean can be written entirely in its native alphabet. Therefore, symbols
from this script will overwhelmingly predominate in any normal Korean text. Chinese
characters, however, are considered learned and prestigious, so a certain number of them
will be encountered in quantities that vary with the pretensions of the author.

The Korean alphabet was developed under the influence of Chinese writing models,
so to the untrained eye Korean alphabetic writing looks like Chinese characters. The letters
of European alphabets form words, but the symbols of the Korean alphabet are grouped
together to form a syllable. This means that a Korean word may extend over several
groupings. Also, while the letters of European words are read horizontally, Korean
alphabetic symbols are read vertically — from the top to the bottom of each group — with the
left preceding the right when the symbols are side-by-side. Figure D-16 illustrates the
symbols of the Korean alphabet. Pay close attention to the second symbol from the left in
the third row, the one that looks like a circle with a stem at the 12 o'clock position. It is a
very frequent symbol and does not look like anything that occurs in Chinese or Japanese.

9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

D-17

Figure D-16. The Korean Alphabet

D-18

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

Appendix E
MARKING AND TAGGING

Labeling CEM properly is vital to the timely exploitation of the item. It speeds up the
often slow process of producing effective countermeasures for the Soldier in combat.
Proper labeling provides the analyst information necessary for the item's timely exploitation.
It also allows interrogators and TECHINT elements to match up knowledgeable prisoners
with the CEM from which they became separated in the evacuation process.

Responsibilities:

The capturing unit is responsible for properly marking and tagging CEM. The
responsibilities must be clearly established by command SOP. The equipment and
document tags accompany the materiel to its final destination. As part of core training, all
personnel should be instructed on how to tag CEM. They should know the consequences
when personnel and equipment are not properly tagged. Training should stress protecting
and preserving the original markings on materiel at the time of capture. Weather-resistant
capture tags are used. They are securely attached to the item itself and to the shipping
container. If weather-resistant tags are not available, use any material (for example, rations
packing) on which pertinent capture data can be recorded.

There are two procedures for marking and tagging CEM. The procedure used depends
on whether or not the captured item is associated with a captured person.

CEM with EPWs:

For CEM with personnel, tag the captured person and any associated CEM with the
three-part EPW tag (DD Form 2745). An example of this tag is at Figure E-1 .

CEM by Itself:

For CEM by itself, tag the piece of equipment and associated document with part C of
the EPW capture tag. In addition, label all documents believed to be of a technical nature
(such as operator manuals) with the flag word "TECHDOC."

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 E-1

1. DATE AND THE OF CAPTURE

2. SCMALNO. -

3. NAME

4. DATE OF BIFTM

B. RANK

ft. SSMCENO.

7. UNTTOFEPW

8. CApnMNaUMT

9. LOCATION OF CAPTURE {GrM coortfuittm)

10. CnCUMtTAMCES Of
CAPTURE

11. PHVMCAL OOH-
DfnONOFEPW

12. WEAPON*. EflUlfr-
MENT. OOCUHBTTS

n 2746, MAY M REPLACES DA FORM S976, JAN 91,

USABLE UNTIL EXHAUSTED.

ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW)
CAPTURE TAG (PART A)

For use of this form, sea AR 190-8.
The proponent agency is DCSOPS.

Attach this part of tag to EPW. (Do not remove

from EPW.)

1. Search - For weapons, military^lecur^ents, or

special equipment

Silence - Prohibit talking^

of control.

Segregate - By rank, so,

Safeguard ■ To prevent I

Speed - Evacuate from tHe. crjmfiauone.

Tag - Prisoners and documents o/special

equii

Forward to Unit.
(Capturing unit retains for records.)

Use string, wire, or other durable materiel
to attach the appropriate section of this
form to tha EPW's equipment or property.

DOCUMENT/SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
WEAPONS CARD (PART C)

Attach this part of tag to property taken. (Do not
remove from property.)

As a minimum, the tag must include the following
information:

Item 1 . Date and time of capture (YYYYMMDD),
Item 8. Capturing unit.
Item 9. Place of capture (grid coordinates).
Item 10. Circumstances of capture (how the EPW
wet captured).

I TIM, MAY M

REPLACES DA FORM 5976, JAN 91
USABLE UNTIL EXHAUSTED

I 2741 (BACK), MAY M

Figure E-1. Example of the Front and Reverse Sides of an EPW Capture Tag

(DD Form 2745)

E-2

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

Appendix F
MOVEMENT AND STORAGE OF CAPTURED MATERIEL

References:

AFMAN 24-204 (l)/TM 38-250/NAVSUP PUB 505/MCO P4030.19H/DLAI 4145.3, Preparing

Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments
USDOT, Transportation— Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 49 Parts 100-185,

Hazardous Materials Regulations
International Air Transport Association (IATA). See their website http://www.iata.org for

additional information.
TM 60A 1-1-22, EOD Procedures /General EOD Safety Procedures
DOD 6055.9-STD, DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards
DA PAM 385-64, Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards
AR 190-1 1 , Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives

Purpose: Assist in the decision making process pertaining to transportation and storage of
captured materiel (CM).

General: Transportation and storage of CM can involve serious hazards and risks to personnel
and facilities. This appendix provides reference materials to aid in the safe movement and
storage of CM. Figure F-1 provides a decision matrix to evaluate CM for transport from the
point of capture to the storage center. Figure F-2 provides a decision matrix to evaluate CM for
proper storage at the storage center. Figure F-3 provides a decision matrix to evaluate CM for
transport from the storage center to CONUS.

Storage Center: Storage areas must be provided for non-hazardous CM, hazardous (non-
explosive) CM, and explosive CM. Explosive CM will be stored in an ammunition holding area
(AHA). Design and operation of the AHA must be IAW applicable regulations and publications
(DOD 6055.9-STD).

AHAs have specific limits set for Net Explosive Weight (NEW) and the type of explosives that
can be stored. (See DA PAM 385-64.) DA PAM 385-64 also provides guidance regarding the
compatibility for storage of various classes and types of explosives.

Storing hazardous CM may involve various chemicals, batteries, or other hazardous materiel.
The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49 Parts 100 to 185 can be used as a guideline to
determine if an item is hazardous, and what precautions must be taken to safely handle
possible hazards. Measures must be taken to protect all CM from adverse environmental
conditions.

All personnel involved are responsible for ensuring that the transportation and storage of CM is
carried out in a safe and prudent manner. Anyone that becomes aware of an unsafe condition
will immediately notify all personnel at risk and take appropriate corrective action to mitigate the
hazard.

Note: SAFETY IS PRIORITY NUMBER 1 WHEN TRANSPORTING AND STORING

CAPTURED MATERIEL.

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 F-1

Captured Materiel
(CM)

Non-Hazardous

Maneuver Unit or

TECHINTTeam

Assessment

Hazardous

Package, Ship
and Store IAW
Applicable Pubs

Explosive
Hazard

EOD Assessment

No Explosive
Hazard

EOD Determine if

CM is Safe to

Transport

Package, Ship,

and Store IAW

Applicable Pubs

Package, Ship and

Store IAW

Applicable Pubs

Figure F-1. Movement of Captured Materiel from Collection Point to Storage

Non-Hazardous
Storage

Catalog and Store
IAW Applicable Pubs

Considerations

1. Physical Security

2. Disposal

3. Environmental

Captured Materiel

Hazardous Materiel
Storage

Establish Type of
Hazardous Materiel

Catalog and Store
IAW Applicable Pubs

Considerations

1. HAZMAT Segregation

2. Spill Cleanup

3. Physical Security

4. Disposal

Explosive Storage

Establish Type of
Explosive

Catalog and Store
IAW Applicable Pubs

Considerations

1. Compatibility

2. Standoff Distances

3. Physical Security

4. Disposal

Figure F-2. Storage Decision Making Matrix

F-2

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

Captured Materiel

Non-Explosive

Hazardous Materiels

(HM)

Non-Hazardous
Storage

Explosive Hazardous
Materiels

EOD Safe-to Ship
Certification

Package and Ship
IAW Applicable Pubs

Figure F-3. Shipment to CONUS Decision Matrix

9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

F-3

This page intentionally left blank.

REFERENCES

Joint

NATO STANAG 2084, Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and
Documents, Edition No. 6, May 1999

Army

AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other
Detainees

AR 190-1 1 , Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives
DA PAM 385-64, Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards
FM 34-54, Technical Intelligence, January 1998
TM 60A 1-1-22, EOD Procedures /General EOD Safety Procedures

Air Force

AFI 99-114, Foreign Materiel Program, September 1998

AFMAN 24-204 (l)/TM 38-250/NAVSUP PUB 505/MCO P4030.19H/DLAI 4145.3,
Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments

Navy

OPNAVINST 3882.2A, Navy Foreign Materiel Program, 23 August 1993

Other

USDOT, Transportation— Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 49 Parts 100-185,
Hazardous Materials Regulations

International Air Transport Association (IATA). See their website http://www.iata.org for
additional information.

DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag

DOD 6055.9-STD, DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards

9 June 2006 FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01 .4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63 REFERENCES-1

This page intentionally left blank.

GLOSSARY

PART I - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACE

AFACSI

AFMIC

AFOSI

AFSC

AFTTP

AHA

AIA

AMC

AML

ATF

ATGM

BDA
BDE
BN

CAHA

CBIST

CBRN

CBRNE

CC&D

CCIR

C-E

CEE

CEM

CEXC

A
Active Component
Analysis and Control Element
Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
Air Force Office of Special Investigations
Air Force Specialty Code
Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
ammunition holding area
Air Intelligence Agency
Army Materiel Command
Army Medical Laboratory

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire Arms, and Explosives
antitank guided missile

B
battle damage assessment
brigade
battalion

command and control

command, control, and communications

Captured Ammunition Holding Area

chemical-biological

chemical and biological intelligence support team

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield
explosive

camouflage, concealment, and deception

commander's critical information requirement

communications-electronics

captured enemy equipment

captured enemy materiel

Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell

9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

GLOSSARY-1

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CM&D

collection management and dissemination

captured materiel

CMA

Chemical Materials Agency

CMEC

Captured Materiel Exploitation Center

COMTECHREP

Complementary Technical Intelligence Report

CONUS

continental United States

COSCOM

corps support command

CSS

combat service support
n

1—/

Department of the Army

DARPA

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DETECHREP

detailed technical report

Department of Health

DHS

Defense HUMINT Service

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency

DNI

Director of Naval Intelligence

DOC EX

documents exploitation

DOD

Department of Defense

DOE

Department of Energy

DOS

Department of State

DTRA

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EAC

echelons above corps

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

EPW

enemy prisoner of war

electronic warfare

F
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBI

field manual

FMA

foreign materiel acquisition

FME

foreign materiel exploitation

FMEP

Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program

FMP

Foreign Materiel Program

FMT

Foreign Materiel for Training

FRAGORD

fragmentary order

FSAC

Fire Support Armaments Center

GLOSSARY-2

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

HMTO

HQDA

HUMINT

ICE

IED

IEW

IMEP

IMINT

INSCOM

IPB

JCBRND

JCMEC

JDEC

JFC

JIDC

JTF

JTIPG

MAN PADS

MASINT

MCIA

MEDEX

MIRC

MOS

MSIC

MTTP

NASIC

NATO

NAVEODTECHCEN

NEW

H
Hazardous Material Transportation Office
Headquarters, Department of the Army
human intelligence

I
in-country exploitation team
improvised explosive device
intelligence and electronic warfare
intelligence information report
International Materiel Evaluation Program
imagery intelligence

US Army Intelligence and Security Command
intelligence preparation of the battlespace
intelligence requirement

joint chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological
defense

joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center

Joint Document Exploitation Center

joint force commander

Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center

joint task force

Joint TECHINT Planning Group

M
man-portable air defense system
measurement and signature intelligence
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
medical exploitation
Military Intelligence

Military Intelligence Readiness Command
Military Occupational Specialty
Missile and Space Intelligence Center
multi-Service tactics techniques and procedures

N
National Air and Space Intelligence Center
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center
net explosive weight

9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

GLOSSARY-3

NGIC
NIPRNET
NMJIC
NSA

ONI
OP LAN
OPORD

National Ground Intelligence Center
Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network
National Military Joint Intelligence Center
National Security Agency

O
Office of Naval Intelligence
operations plan
operations order

PCC

PCI

PIR

PRETECHREP

R&D

RDEC

RDECOM

RFF

RSP

S&T

S&TI

SALUTE

SAM

SASO

SATCOM

SIGINT

SIPRNET

SIR

SME

SOP

SRBM

SSC

SSE

STANAG

STILO

pre-combat check
pre-combat inspection
priority intelligence requirement
preliminary technical report

R
research and development
reserve component

research, development, and engineering center
Research, Development, and Engineering Command
request for forces
render safe procedures

S
scientific and technical
scientific and technical intelligence
size, activity, location, unit/uniform, time, and equipment
surface-to-air missile
stability and support operations
satellite communication
signals intelligence

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
specific information request
subject matter expert
standard operating procedure
short-range ballistic missile
surface-to-surface
Soldiers System Center
sensitive site exploitation
Standardization Agreement
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Liaison Officer

GLOSSARY-4

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

TACON

TECHINT

TECOM

TOC

TSMO

TTP

USARC

UTC

UXO

WIT

tactical control

technical escort

technical intelligence

Test and Evaluation Command

tactical operations center

Threat Systems Management Office

tactics, techniques, and procedures

U
US Army Reserve Command
Unit Type Code
unexploded ordnance

W
weapons intelligence team

9 June 2006

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

GLOSSARY-5

This page intentionally left blank.

INDEX

MSIC 11-1, 111-1

203d Ml 11-1, II-2, III-3, A-3

Mission 11-1

NASIC 11-1

NAVEODTECHCEN 11-1

NGIC 11-1, III-3, B-4, D-1

AFMIC 11-1, 111-1

AMC III-3

ONI.

11-1

CBRNE

CEM vii, 1-3,11-1,11

V-3, V-5, V-6, A-2, A-3,

C-3, C-4, E-1

by itself

Marking and Tagging...

Movement and Storage

with EPWs

I-3, I
A-4.

II-4, IV-4,
A-5, A-6

.... III-2, C-

V-1 , V-2,
B-1, B-2,

E-1

F-1

E-1

CHECKLISTS C-1

CMEC vii, 1-1, 1-2,11-1,11-2,111-3, 111-4, IV-1, IV-2,

IV-3, IV-4, V-1 , V-2, V-4, V-5, V-6, A-2, A-3, A-4,
A-5, A-6, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-7, C-4, D-1

Concept of Operations V-5

Command Relationships IV-1

COMTECHREP IV-4, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4

Photography C-1

Base-line C-1, C-2

Detailed C-1, C-2

Photolog Diagram C-2

Pre-Combat Checks C-1

Pre-Combat Inspections C-1

PRETECHREP IV-4, B-1, B-2, B-4

Priority Listings B-6

S&TI 1-1, I-2, 111-1, III-2, III-3, III-4, IV-2, IV-4,

V-6, A-5, B-7

SALUTE Report IV-3, V-5, B-1, C-4

Sensitive Site Exploitation IV-4

STILO III-4, IV-2, V-2

DARPA 111-1

DETECHREP B-1, B-7

DIA vii, 11-1, II-2, 111-1, IV-2, IV-3, V-1, V-2, V-3,

V-4, V-5, A-5, A-6, B-4

diacritics D-3, D-11

DOCEX 111-1, IV-2, IV-3, D-1, D-8

DTRA 111-1, IV-2

EOD II-2, 111-1, III-2, III-3, III-4, IV-2, IV-3, IV-4,

V-4, A-3, A-6, B-3, B-4, B-6, C-3, C-4, F-1

INSCOM III-2, III-3

Joint Theater Technical Intelligence Appendix... .A-2

Task Organization IV-1

TECHINT

Battlefield I-3

Exploitation IV-3

Maneuver S-2 Checklist C-4

Mission 1-1

Operations and Procedures C-3

Operations Cycle IV-2

Reporting IV-4

Reports B-1

Responsibilities V-3

Technical Advisors V-1

Technical Escort III-2

Technical Intelligence Report B-2, B-3, B-7

Technical Intelligence Summary B-7

Technical Intelligence Update Report B-7

TECHSUM B-1

Theater Army Intelligence Annex A-1

TIR B-1, B-7

MCIA.

INDEX-1

FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(l) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

This page intentionally left blank.

FM 2-22.401

NTTP 2-01.4

AFTTP(I) 3-2.63

9 June 2006

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW

Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

0618706

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER

General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: Distribute in accordance
with the initial distribution number (IDN) 115963 requirements for FM 2-22.401.

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force

JAMES F. JACKSON

Brigadier General, US Air Force

Commander

Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

Air Force Distribution: F

PIN: 083377-000

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